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REFLECTIONS ON VAWA'S STRANGE BEDFELLOWS:
THE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE BATTERED
IMMIGRANT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
Alizabeth Newman*
"[T]his is our failure and our challenge for the twenty-first
century: to reclaim a movement, to reform a vision, and to resituate
ourselves within a feminist politic that refuses to sacrifice women's
experience and autonomy to the prerogatives of the state."'
INTRODUCTION
During the same two decades in which immigrants in the U.S. have
seen their rights and options severely diminished, a small subset of
immigrant victims of domestic abuse and other crimes received
heightened attention and have continued to benefit from strengthened
and widening pathways to legal immigration status.2 Since 1996
Congress has passed a series of monumentally restrictive legislative
changes, significantly altering the immigration system as we knew it.
Established concepts in immigration law from "entry" and
"lawfulness" were revamped, making it increasingly difficult for
newcomers to arrive or others to remain within U.S. borders.4 Those
seeking safe haven in the U.S. faced stringent regulations and
applicants for immigration status with even minor criminal
convictions confronted unforgiving penalties.' For over a decade,
immigration reform has appeared consistently on the national
* Author is a Clinical Professor at CUNY School of Law. I am grateful for the
comments and support of Professors Susan Bryant, Janet Calvo, Julie Goldscheid, and
the CUNY Law summer writing group, as well as the research assistance of Alfia
Agish.
I. G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the
Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 Hous. L. REV. 237, 323
(2005).
2. See infra Parts I.A, II.
3. See infra Parts I.A-B.
4. See infra Parts L.A-B.
5. See infra Part I.A.
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agenda,' but all attempts at passing either comprehensive or
piecemeal legislation failed, revealing little political will for reform.'
Only recently after the 2013 elections has there been a renewed
energy toward reform with viable, bipartisan proposals in play in
both congressional houses.' Yet in the midst of the downward spiral
from 1996 to present, thousands of immigrant survivors of domestic
violence have found safety and independence from their abusers
through legalization exemptions created by the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA) and its reauthorizations. 9
Strategic choices within the women's rights movement to partner
with law enforcement made these advances possible. As was the case
of the battered women's movement in the 1960s and 1970s,"o battered
immigrant women benefited substantially from this partnership but at
the same time, sacrificed some key movement goals." A
conservative, law enforcement framing of the law has led to a sharp
deviation from the fundamental principles of the battered women's
movement in terms of defining which battered women can secure
relief, and in the degree of agency they are afforded in the process. 2
The focus in the more recent VAWA provisions for immigrant
women has strayed from the initial political and social message that
no woman should be trapped in an abusive home, and has returned to
archaic conceptions of domestic abuse that demand deserving victims
and dependence in order to access relief' 3 The contentious debates
6. See infra Part II.
7. Ashley Parker, On Immigration, Obama Draws Bipartisan Praise, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
14, 2013.
8. Julia Preston, Obama Will Seek Citizenship Path in One Fast Push, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
13, 2013, at Al; Julia Preston, Republicans Reconsider Positions on Immigration,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2012, at A12; Rosalind Helderman & Sean Sullivan, Bipartisan
Group Of Senators To Unveil Framework For Immigration Overhaul, WASH. POST
(Jan. 28, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-28/politics/
36583603_ 1 illegal-immigrants-immigration-laws-immigration-system; Julia Preston,
Showing Grassroots Support for Immigration Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2012, at
Al1.
9. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994)
[hereinafter VAWA 1994]; Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) [hereinafter VTVPA]; Violence
Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006) [hereinafter VAWA 2005]; see infra Part II.
10. See SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES
OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 157-61 (1982).
11. See infra Parts III, IV.A.2.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Part IV.B.
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over the recent 2013 VAWA Reauthorization split the issues directly
along party lines.14
This article adds to the wealth of retrospective examinations of the
early women's movement choices to partner with law enforcement by
extending that reflection to the parallel course charted by battered
immigrant women. The analysis of the history of VAWA and its
progeny studies an anomaly of emerging protections for some
immigrants amid the storm of restrictive immigration revisions for
the majority. Part I provides background to the article with an
overview of the erosion of rights in the immigration schema since the
1990s. Part II describes the exceptional tools VAWA made available
to immigrant survivors of domestic violence during that same
timeframe. Part III compares the controversial choices made first by
the women's movement with those of the battered immigrant
women's advocates to create alliances with law enforcement. Each
group overcame deep concerns to strategically partner with the power
of the state for specific gains."
Part IV probes the unintended consequences of these partnerships.
In achieving their goals, each group of advocates compromised some
of the core movement values." Commendably more legislative
pathways to legal status were created for immigrant survivors of
domestic violence, however, many requirements to access status are
anathema to the movement's feminist roots." This section examines
the substance of the law in its definition of the survivor/victim and in
the level of dependence demanded to utilize the law. Part V
concludes the article with an invitation for advocates and lawyers to
rise to the challenge posed above by Professor Miccio to engage
together in reflective conversations as we proceed in this work, with
the hope of reclaiming the foundational principles of the women's
movement.
14. Times Topics, Violence Against Women Act, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/d/domestic-violence/inde
x.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part IV.
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I. REDUCTION OF IMMIGRATION PATHWAYS IN THE 1990s
A. Restrictive Legislative Changes
In 1996 long-established constructs of immigration were upset by
two major pieces of legislation, the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IRAIRA) and the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).'" "Deportation"" ceased to
exist and the more sanitized term "removal" was created.20 The
concept of due process was also re-envisioned. From as far back as
the Chinese Exclusion Act2' in the 1880s, the U.S. immigration
system acknowledged some level of rights to a non-citizen upon
entry.2 2 This premise was overturned with IIRAIRA,23 now granting
a basic level of rights only upon a legal "admission."2 4 The
controversial classification "aggravated felony"2 was introduced to
bar immigrants with serious criminal convictions for crimes
involving moral turpitude,2 6 which at one point had been interpreted
18. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of8, 18, 22, 28, and 42
U.S.C.) and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA)
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208.
19. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(a)(3), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-587-90 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5) (2006)) (stating prior to 1996, deportation was the
term used by the U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration
Review (EOIR) to demand an immigrant leave the United States).
20. Congress enacted Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 101(a)(47) in 1996
in section 440(b) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1277 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ I 101(a)(47)(A) (2006)). A year later, through the enactment of IIRAIRA, Congress
created removal proceedings with resulting removal orders. Pub. L. 104-208,
§ 240(b)(5), 110 Stat. at 3009-546, 3009-589-90 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)).
IIRAIRA section 309(d)(2) provided that references to orders of removal are deemed
to include references to orders of deportation. Accordingly, INA section 101(a)(47)
applies to orders of removal.
21. See Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943).
22. See 8 U.S.C. § Il0 1(a)(13) (1994) (entry vs. exclusion), amended by IIRAIRA § 301;
8 U.S.C §§ 1222-26 (outlining procedures for exclusion), amended by IIRAIRA
§ 308.
23. See IIRAIRA, 110 Stat. 3009-546-724 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101).
24. IIRAIRA § 301(a), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(13) (2006).
25. Id. § 32 1(a), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43).
26. INA § 212(a)(2)(a)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(a)(i), INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2006) (making deportable any legal permanent resident who,
within the first 5 years of gaining status, is convicted of even one crime involving
moral turpitude (CIMT) for which potential sentence is one year or more).
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so widely as to include jumping a New York City turnstile.2 7
Remaining in the U.S. without permission became codified as
"unlawful presence"28 that could bar access to immigration status.2 9
Detention became mandatory for those arriving without authorization
at ports of entry,30  even for political asylum seekers escaping
persecution.3 I These laws were initially deemed retroactive.32
The first of the harsh bills was AEDPA, 3 ironically justified by a
U.S. citizen's bombing of the Oklahoma federal building.34 This
bill's most shocking clause was one to suspend for immigrants the
writ of habeas corpus, the most fundamental protection of the
individual from unjustified governmental infringement of liberty. 35
Constitutional challenges to this suspension re-affirmed the import of
27. A class A misdemeanor in New York can be punishable for up to one year. N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 165.15 (McKinney 2010). An aggravated felony includes a theft
offense or a burglary offense plus a sentence of imprisonment of at least one year.
INA §237(a)(2)(A)(iii); 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). While turnstile jumping has been
determined not to be an aggravated felony, it is a deportable offense if committed
within 5 years of obtaining legal permanent resident status, as a "crime involving
moral turpitude" that carries a potential sentence of at least one year. INA
§237(a)(2)(A)(i); 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
28. See IIRAIRA § 301(b)(1) (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii)
(2006)) (applying unlawful presence "if the alien is present in the United States after
the expiration of the period of stay authorized by the Attorney General or is present in
the United States without being admitted or paroled").
29. INA § 212(a)(9)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i) (triggering a 3 or 10 year bar for
those unlawfully present for more than 180 or 365 days respectively).
30. INA § 241(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(2) (requiring mandatory detention during the
removal period).
31. See id. § 235(b)(1)(B)(ii), 302(a) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A))
and § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (permitting applicant's
release from detention only after passing a credible fear interview).
32. See IIRAIRA § 301(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a); In re Collado-Munoz, 21 1. & N. Dec.
1061, 1063-64 (B.I.A. 1998).
33. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42
U.S.C.).
34. See Rabea Chaudhry, Effective Advocacy in a Time of Terror: Redefining the Legal
Representation of a Suspected Terrorist Facing Secret Evidence, 8 UCLA J. ISLAMIC
& NEAR E.L. 101, 114 (2009) (noting that the reaction to create more stringent
immigration laws ignored the fact that the violence was executed by a native-born
U.S. citizen).
35. See AEDPA § 104(1)-(3) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)-(3)). But
cf Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Untold Story ofNoncriminal Habeas Corpus and the 1996
Immigration Acts, 107 YALE L.J. 2509, 2524-25 (1998) (detailing the tradition of
common law courts to exercise a broad scope of review where confinement presented
a threat to one's right to liberty).
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the writ for citizens and non-citizens alike." Equally caustic were the
provisions of mandatory detention of legal permanent residents
convicted of a wide range of criminal offenses, including
shoplifting7 or minor drug offenses." The Supreme Court validated
the use of mandatory detention," but limited the indefinite detention
provisions.4 0
Within another six months, Congress passed even more sweeping
legislation, IIRAIRA. 4 1 Whereas a non-citizen without proper
immigration documents may have previously been unable to obtain
legal working papers and may have been vulnerable to deportation,
IIRAIRA first created the concept of "unlawful presence" that could
permanently obstruct the legalization process.4 2 This bill erased any
sense of security that legal permanent residents had enjoyed by
mandating that a return to the U.S. after travel could under certain
circumstances be considered as seeking new admission to the
country,43 and by enacting retroactive changes to the types of crimes
that could cause a legal permanent resident to lose legal status and
face removal." IIRAIRA also built on AEDPA's expansion of the
list of crimes that would trigger mandatory detention. 45  Further,
IIRAIRA substantially limited federal judicial review of immigration
cases, stripping the courts of jurisdiction for any discretionary
36. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 290 (2001).
37. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2006); INA
§ 212(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(2)(A)(ii) (providing an exception for just one
offense); See generally St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 294-98 (describing the erosion, as a result
of AEDPA and IIRAIRA, of the rights held by permanent-resident aliens to apply for
a discretionary deportation waiver).
38. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I1). Any conviction or admission
of a controlled substance violation (as defined in section 802 of title 21) is a ground
for inadmissibility. See also id. § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (stating the only
exception is for possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana).
39. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003) (ruling that the mandatory detention
provision of IIRAIRA was constitutional).
40. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001), the Court examined the detention of
lawful permanent residents under final deportation orders. It held that "[o]nce
removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer
authorized." Id. at 699. In Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005), the Court
held that the same analysis must be applied to inadmissible noncitizens as well as to
noncitizens who are removable.
41. See IIRAIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
42. See IIRAIRA § 301(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B).
43. See id. § 301(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 101(a)(13), (a)(27)(A).
44. See id. § 304, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
45. See id. § 321, 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43) (amending the definition of aggravated felony).
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decisions.46 Lastly, IIRAIRA created a climate of fear in immigrant
communities through the encouragement of agreements between
localities and the federal government to cooperate in immigration
enforcement.47
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, Congress
reacted again to further impede immigration by closing the main legal
artery for undocumented immigrants being sponsored by family
members or employers to legalize their immigration status.4 8
eliminating use of a special payment structure previously available to
forgive prior immigration violations,49 Congress blocked the
legalization path for over a million family members of U.S. citizens
and legal permanent residents."
By 2003, the entire administrative scheme governing immigration
was restructured, breaking up the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) under the Department of Justice into
three separate agencies under the new Department of Homeland
Security." To the extent that these titles described the national
posture toward immigration, the vision of the institution shifted from
one of service to newcomers (the Immigration and Naturalization
46. Id. § 303(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e).
47. See id. § 133, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (resulting in profound disagreement throughout
mixed status communities and police localities, which fear the consequences of the
loss of trust between local police and vulnerable populations).
48. See MARC R. ROSENBLUM, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY SINCE 9/11: UNDERSTANDING
THE STALEMATE OVER COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM 6-8 (2011).
49. INA, Pub. L. No. 103-317, § 245(i), 108 Stat. 1765-66 (1994), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(i)
(2006) was an experimental provision that allowed non-citizens who had fallen out of
status or those who never obtained documents to move forward with paths to family
or employment-based immigration, paying a super-fee of $1,000 to have their
immigration infractions waived. Without this provision, most undocumented
immigrants were unable to obtain status. They could not legalize in the United States
and if they were to leave the country voluntarily, even to attend their consular
interview, sanctions were imposed for three or ten years. See INA § 212(a)(9)(B), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B) (2006).
50. Ted Hesson, New Immigration Process Will Keep Families Together, ABC NEWS
(Jan. 3, 2013, 5:31 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/m/story?id=18116673 (referring to a
temporary fix crafted by the Obama Administration to overcome the effects of the
unlawful presence bars).
51. DHS was created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116
Stat. 2135 on November 25, 2002. It merged the legacy INS into DHS as of March 1,
2003, creating U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 33 (2005).
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Service), to the defensive management of an inherent potential threat
to the county (Department of Homeland Security).52
Next, the Justice Department cut the number of members sitting on
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and encouraged rubber-
stamping of Immigration Judges' decisions by permitting
"affirmation without decision."" The federal appellate court backlog
grew untenable with immigrants seeking meaningful judicial review
that they could no longer find at the BIA.54 The huge rise in the
number of immigration appeals continues to plague the federal
system." Ongoing constitutional challenges attempt to push back on
many of these provisions with mixed results.
B. Criminalization oflmmigrants
Immigration violations have always been civil, not criminal, in
nature. Thus, there is no right to counsel in immigration
proceedings despite the grave deprivations of liberty such as
indefinite detention, loss of one's home, job, and family, or virtual
52. The primary missions of DHS are preventing terrorist attacks within the United States,
reducing the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimizing the
damage from potential attacks and natural disasters. Our Mission: Homeland
Security, HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/our-mission (last visited Jan. 11,
2013). In contrast, the former INS was charged with implementation of laws of
naturalizing, admitting, rejecting, and processing all immigrants seeking entry to the
United States, and policing and expelling those who entered or remained without
permission. 1891 Immigration Act, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084-86. Even the
language "homeland" raises ethnic nationalist ideals, calling forth images of Nazi
Germany.
53. See generally Martin S. Krezalek, How to Minimize the Risk of Violating Due Process
Rights While Preserving the BIA's Ability to Affirm Without Opinion, 21 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 277, 279, 288, 296, 314 (2007).
54. See, e.g., OFFICE OF PLANNING AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE
FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2004 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK B5 fig.2 (2005),
available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy04syb.pdf (showing immigration
cases from fiscal years 2000-2004).
55. As of July 31, 2012, there are currently 320,331 pending immigration cases on the
federal docket. Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRACIMMIGRATION (July 31,
2012), http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/courtbacklog/.
56. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513
(2003); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,
297-98 (2001).
57. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913); Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
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exile from a long-established life in the United States." In 2010, the
U.S. Supreme Court clarified that given the severity of the
consequences to an immigrant of a criminal conviction, a defense
attorney has an affirmative duty to advise about the immigration
implications of plea bargains.5 9 A breach of this duty can serve as the
basis for vacating an agreement.60
More and more, public opinion has equated undocumented
immigrants with criminals. The construct of "unlawful presence,"
while not a crime, gave fuel to anti-immigrant groups insistent on
publically categorizing immigrants with no status as "illegals."6 1
Bill Ong Hing describes a calculated campaign to criminalize
immigrants as an instrument of control. 62  The process begins by
dehumanizing the immigrant.6 1 "[T]hen she is demonized and
labeled a problem," and finally, Hing argues, is "further dehumanized
until at last her actions or conditions are criminalized." 64 In reality,
this dehumanization begins with the very labeling of immigrants in
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as "aliens," connoting
"other" or "foreign," and fostering fear." Popular media aids this
58. See, e.g., Russell Engler, Shaping a Context-Based Civil Gideon from the Dynamics of
Social Change, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 697, 700 (2006) (arguing that there
should be a civil right to counsel); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478, 1480
(2010). The Padilla decision was a breakthrough in acknowledging the severity of the
immigration consequences of a criminal conviction, previously dismissed as
collateral. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478, 1480.
59. Padilla, at 1483, 1486 (holding that a criminal defense attorney must advise non-
citizen clients about the deportation risks of a guilty plea, advising if a conviction
"may" or will have immigration consequences); see also Chaidez v. United States,
113 S. Ct. 1103 (2013) (clarifying that Padilla does not apply retroactively to cases
already final on direct review).
60. Id. at 1482-83.
61. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
2037, 2044 (2008) (observing that "some advocates start-and end-their arguments
by pointing out that some noncitizens are 'illegal aliens,"' an "unforgiving approach
to unlawful immigration find[ing] broad resonance in a post-9/11 climate," while
others consider "unlawful presence . . . [as] merely a formal status that overlooks
contributions made to U.S. society and ties acquired . . . [in U.S.] with government
acquiescence," prefer the term "'undocumented').
62. Bill Ong Hing, Understanding SB1070 from the Lens of Institutionalized Racism and
Civil Rights, THE RACE EQUITY PROJECT, LEGAL SERVS. OF N. CAL.,
http://equity.Isnc.net/understanding-sb 1070-from-the-lens-of-institutionalized-racism-
and-civil-rights/#_ftn15 (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See INA § 101(a)(3), (15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3), (15) (2006) (defining the terms
alien and immigrant).
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effort, playing on common fears." While statistically immigrants
commit crimes at a rate half of U.S. citizens, media stories abound,
sensationalizing incidents in which undocumented men commit
violent crimes." Concurrently, refurbished regulations under the new
Department of Homeland Security, the Secret Service, and Federal
Emergency Management send a clear message that immigrants
represent a threat that must be controlled."
In fact, over the last decade immigration authorities have found
ways to criminalize unauthorized immigrants for entering or simply
existing in the U.S. Prior to the 1990s, border agents managed cases
of those caught crossing the border by processing a voluntary return
or a civil violation. This policy changed radically in 2005 with the
Bush administration's Operation Streamline that removed discretion
and mandated criminal prosecution.6 9 First-time offenders were
charged with misdemeanor illegal entry, while those with prior
deportations, felony illegal reentry."o Laborers working under false
social security numbers were arraigned with federal crimes ranging
from false identification to being found in the U.S. after removal."
The very act of immigrating and participating in the natural flow of
labor following capital, became criminal.7 2  The phenomenon of
criminalization, however, is neither new nor unique to the U.S., but
represents a global trend." Some have concluded it to be both the
66. David L. Altheide, The Mass Media, Crime and Terrorism, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 982,
982-997 (2006).
67. See Kristin F. Butcher & Anne Morrison Piehl, Crime, Corrections, and California:
What Does Immigration have to do with It? in 9 California Counts: Population Trends
and Profiles at 2, 7-9 (Pub. Policy Ins. of Cal. Ed., 2008), available at
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/cacounts/CC_208KBCC.pdf (finding that
immigrants are about half as likely to become involved in crime).
68. See Noel L. Griswold, Note, Forgetting the Melting Pot: An Analysis of the
Department of Homeland Security Takeover of the INS, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 207,
208-10, 221-22, 224-25, 227, 229-31 (2005) (arguing that when the Department of
Homeland Security was created, immigration began to be treated less as a benefit to
the economy and more as a threat to national security).
69. See Joanna Jacobbi Lyndgate, Assembly-line Justice: A Review of Operation
Streamline, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 481, 482-84 (2010).
70. Id. at 484.
71. See Ira J. Kurzban, Criminalizing Immigration Law, in 42ND ANNUAL IMMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE 321, 326-27 (2009).
72. See id. at 326-27; DAVID BACON, ILLEGAL PEOPLE: How GLOBALIZATION CREATES
MIGRATION AND CRIMINALIZES IMMIGRANTS 5 (2008).
73. See BACON, supra note 72, at 71-73, 75. United States and European systems have
never acknowledged legitimacy to social or economic rights. Id. at 74-77, 80-81. As
our political and economic systems grow increasingly globalized, they create illegality
by displacing people and then denying them rights or equality as they adapt to the
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"'productive' and the 'intended' consequence[] of state policies of
social control," endemic to the neoliberal agenda.74
II. VITAL EXPANSION OF BENEFITS FOR IMMIGRANT
SURVIVORS OF ABUSE SINCE THE 1990s
During the same time period, the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) of 1994'5 was passed as a result of a massive, coordinated
effort by advocates to secure protection for survivors of domestic
abuse, including immigrant survivors." Law enforcement was
enlisted to improve criminal justice and community-based responses
to domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking in
the United States. 7 The initial purpose of VAWA was "to deter and
punish violent crimes against women" by providing law enforcement
with additional tools to combat domestic violence, and by making it
easier for victims to come forward." Importantly, included in the Act
was Subtitle G, Protections for Battered Immigrant Women and
Children, the first substantial legislation addressing the plight of
immigrant women suffering from domestic abuse.7 9 Within a mixed-
status marriage, an abusive United States citizen or legal permanent
resident had complete control of his immigrant spouse's immigration
status, and thus her ability to work to support herself and her
children, to travel, and to access most public benefits. 0 The abused
spouse would commonly fear that seeking help could instead lead to
her arrest, deportation, and separation from her children."' VAWA
economic fluctuations and follow the labor demand in order to survive. Id. at 23, 70,
74-77, 80-81.
74. See KRISTIN BUMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE STATE: How NEOLIBERALISM APPROPRIATED
THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE 11-12 (2008) (proffering that
when this trend examined in the historical and cultural context, it cannot be dismissed
as unintended consequences).
75. Enacted as Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13701
(2006)).
76. Violence Against Women Act, H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 25 (1993).
77. VAWA 1994, supra note 9, § 40121, 108 Stat. at 1910-11.
78. Violence Against Women Act, H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 25.
79. VAWA 1994, supra note 9, § 40701, 108 Stat. at 1953 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1154(a) (2006)). Note that while passed under the VAWA, the language of
the provisions are gender neutral. Given that the vast majority of abuse in domestic
relationships is perpetrated by men against women, this article will continue to refer to
survivors as women, recognizing that men can also be victimized by the same abuses
of power.
80. Violence Against Women Act, H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 26.
81. Id.
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Subtitle G publically recognized that immigration laws had been
manipulated as a tool for abuse and control of immigrant women.82
The bill introduced the construct of self-petitioning for immigration
status: a process that enabled an abused immigrant to manage the
legalization process herself, independent from the control of the
abusive U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident spouse. A similar
process was crafted for those in deportation or removal proceedings.84
These early VAWA provisions did not create new pathways for
battered immigrant women to legalize." Rather, they modified the
existing systems-family petitioning or cancellation of removal-
which would normally benefit a non-citizen married to a U.S. citizen
or legal permanent resident.8 6  The difference was that the general
immigration provisions afforded full dominion to the petitioning
citizen or legal resident to initiate or complete the process." The
VAWA provisions removed that power from the abuser and returned
a battered immigrant woman to the legal posture she would have held
in the immigration process based on her marriage, absent the abuse."
In the debates preceding IIRAIRA, a number of senators voiced
their awareness of the adverse consequences to immigrant survivors
of immigration enforcement, which could be exploited by an abuser
to silence a victim." Among them, Senator Wellstone asserted that
82. Congress recognized that "[m]any immigrant women live trapped and isolated in
violent homes, afraid to turn to anyone for help. They fear both continued abuse if
they stay with their batterers and deportation if they attempt to leave." Id.
83. See VAWA 1994, supra note 9, § 40701(a), 108 Stat. at 1953 (codified as amended at
INA § 204(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § Il54(a)(1)(A)-(D) (2006)).
84. See IIRAIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-594 (codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006)).
85. See VAWA 1994, supra note 9, § 40701(a), 108 Stat. at 1953.
86. See id.; IIRAIRA, § 304(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-594 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(2)(A)(i) (2006)).
87. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1) (1988) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i)-(iii)
(2006)).
88. It did not advance her process, but it would transfer her priority date. See VAWA
1994, supra note 9, § 40701(a), 108 Stat. at 1953 (codified as amended at
204(a)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § I154(a)(1)(D)(i)(III) (2006); 8 C.F.R. 204.2(h)(2)). For
example, the category of spouses of legal permanent residents has a backlog of over
two years. The law did not allow a battered woman to bypass this wait and move to
the front of the line. However, if the woman left her abuser in the midst of the
process, she would hold her place in the backlog, and would not need to begin her
process anew.
89. IIRAIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 384(a), 110 Stat. 3009-652 (codified as amended at
8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)). This provision prohibited DHS from providing any information
about the applicant to the abuser or from denying a case based solely on accusation
from the abuser. Id
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"it would be unconscionable for our immigration laws to facilitate an
abuser's control over his victim."90 To overcome this defect in the
law, a specific amendment was added to shield an applicant from
false allegations by her abuser and to safeguard confidentiality.9 1
This regulation serves as a primary protection for immigrant
survivors to safely utilize the VAWA provisions.9 2
Over the next five years, advocates lobbied Congress in preparation
for the reauthorization of VAWA in 2000, the Victims of Trafficking
and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA).9 ' The issues confronted by
battered immigrant women were again specifically addressed.94
VTVPA 2000 perfected many of the self-petitioning provisions from
the original act, making them more practically useful.95 Most
notably, VTVPA 2000 created the U visa, a new legislative path for
immigrant victims who could not take advantage of the 1994
provisions.96 The U visa opened the door to immigrant victims of
domestic abuse who were not married to U.S. citizens or legal
permanent residents 97 if they could assist law enforcement in
90. 142 CONG. REc. 56, S4306 (1996) (statement of Sen. Paul Wellstone).
91. IIRAIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 384(a), 110 Stat. 3009-652 (codified as amended at
8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)).
92. The House version of the 2013 VAWA reauthorization that was voted down
challenged this confidentiality provision by proposing to allow input from the abuser
to be considered as part of the adjudication process of a self-petitioning battered
spouse. See H.R. 4970 § 801(a)(D) and (b)(4)(IV)(bb), (112th): Violence Against
Women Reauthorization Act of 2012, 112th Cong. (2011-2013).
93. VTVPA, supra note 9.
94. Id., § 1502, 114 Stat. at 1518.
95. Id. VTVPA removed "extreme hardship" as an element of a self-petition. See id §
1503(b) (codified as amended at INA § 204(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)), to allow
approved self-petitioners to adjust status in the U.S. in spite of having entered without
inspection or having overstayed a visa. See id. § 1507(a). And it created age-out
protections for children of self-petitioners who would turn 21 before being able to
complete their legalization process. See id. § 1503(d).
96. See Memorandum from William R. Yates, Assoc. Dir. of Operations for Vermont
Serv. Ctr., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., on Centralization of Interim
Relief for U Nonimmigrant Status Applicants at 1 (Oct. 8, 2003), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/StaticFiles
Memoranda/Archives%201998-2008/2003/ucntrl00803.pdf (explaining that the
VTVPA allowed immigrant victims to stay in the U.S. if they could assist law
enforcement).
97. See id. at 1, 3 (indicating that the list requirements does not include that the victim be
married to a U.S. citizen or be a legal permanent resident). Either a victim was not
married to the abuser, or if she was married, her spouse did not have legal permanent
resident or citizenship status.
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"investigation or prosecution" of the abuser.9 8  Its purpose was "to
strengthen the ability of law enforcement agencies to detect,
investigate and prosecute cases of domestic violence, sexual assault,
trafficking of persons and other criminal activity of which aliens are
victims, while offering protection to victims of such offenses."99
The improvements in immigration protections for battered
immigrant women continued through the Violence Against Women
Act and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005.0
Specifically, Title VIII, "Protection of Battered and Trafficked
Immigrants," removed further obstacles for battered immigrant
women by carving exceptions for survivors of domestic violence on
motions to reopen old deportation or removal orders,10' expanding
self-petitioning provisions to older children,o 2 to elderly parents, 03
and to abused spouses dependent on status in other programs, 04 and
affording an immigration judge discretion in evaluating the weight of
an applicant's criminal convictions.'
The latest VAWA reauthorization in 2013 prevailed only after
contentious negotiations that delayed the renewal for over a year,
allowing the expiration of VAWA in 2011.106 This time the debates
were distinct. With a more partisan congressional environment,
advocates and sponsors are not able to focus productively on practical
98. See VTVPA, supra note 9, § 1513 (codified as amended at INA 101, 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)) (noting that the U visa can be used for a list of enumerated crimes, including
domestic abuse).
99. Memorandum from William R. Yates, supra note 96, at 1.
100. See VAWA 2005, supra note 9.
101. See id § 825(a) (codified as amended at INA 240(c)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)
(2006)).
102. See id. § 805(c) (codified as amended at INA § 204(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)
(2006)).
103. See id. § 816.
104. VAWA 2005 created similar self-petitioning protections for battered spouses of
abusers who were eligible for status under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central
American Relief Act of 1998 § 815, Cuban Adjustment Act § 823, and Haitian
Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998, § 824.
105. See VTVPA, supra note 9, § 1505(b) (codified as amended at INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2006)). Previously any crime of domestic violence meant mandatory
deportability.
106. Laura Bassett and Jennifer Bendery, House GOP Lets Violence Against Women Act
Passed By Senate Die Without a Vote, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 2, 2013, 6:38 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/02/violence-against-women-act-
_n_2398553.html. Cf New Classification for Victims of Severe Forms of Trafficking
in Persons; Eligibility for T Noninmigrant Status, 77 Fed. Reg. 61,7743 (Feb. 13,
2012) (negotiations resulting in rule establishing application procedures and
responsibilities for DHS).
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expansions of protections for battered immigrant women, but instead
defended against the elimination of some of the basic existing
provisions.' The bill was successful in adding anti-discrimination
assurances for the LGBT community' and it extended protections to
victims in tribal regions.109 For immigrant survivors, it modestly
improved protections by eliminating the obstacles of public charge"0
and aging out of dependent children,"' drafting warnings for fianc6s
and fianc6es of U.S. citizens to better inform them of their rights,"12
and implementing regulations of international marriage brokers."'
Concessions were made to opponents of the bill in the form of
accountability provisions for grant recipients"' and a qualification of
confidentiality for law enforcement and national security purposes."'
III. MOVEMENT CHOICES TO PARTNER WITH LAW
ENFORCEMENT
The story of how advocates for battered immigrant women were
able to stem the tides of the burgeoning anti-immigrant currents to
secure protections for this otherwise voiceless population is a
remarkable one. To begin, this achievement must be applauded as a
grassroots organizing victory for battered immigrant women who
gained the only advances for immigrants during that period and did
so repeatedly."6 At the same time that these developments are
107. Tara Culp-Ressler, Violence Against Women Act Debacle: Why Congress Should be
More Diverse, THE ATLANTIC, Jan. 3, 2013, www.theatlantic.com/sexes/
archive/2013/0I/...act.../266784/. Also see Jennifer Bendery, Violence Against
Women Act: Eric Cantor, Joe Biden in Talks Amid Stalled Tribal Provisions, THE
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/
06/violence-against-women-act-eric-cantor-native-americans n2251924.html. See
also Robert Pear, House Vote Sets Up Battle on Domestic Violence Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 2012, at A19 (noting Representative Zoe Lofgren's assertion that "[t]he
House bill rolls back protections for battered spouses and victims of serious crimes
such as rape and sexual assault. It does so by weakening or repealing provisions that
have had near-unanimous support of Democrats and Republicans in years past").
108. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 3(b)(4),
(2013).
109. Id. § 902.
110. Id § 804.
111. Id. § 805(a).
112. Id § 807.
113. Id. § 808.
114. Id. § 1005.
115. Id. § 810.
116. See, e.g., LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN:
A SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE 36
(2008).
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celebrated, a critical analysis of the aftermath of these legislative
feats reveals unforeseen costs to the feminist movement, undermining
some of its most fundamental principles."' These outcomes are
similar to the experiences of battered women's advocates in the
1960s and 1970s." 8
A. Battered Women's Movement
The decision to seek out law enforcement as a primary response to
domestic violence was not made lightly in the early feminist
movement. Battered women's advocates believed criminal
enforcement of domestic violence laws to be crucial to the protection
of women, and they cautiously examined the tensions inherent in
working with the state." 9
Movement leaders demanded accountability from the batterer and
from the state. 20 To varying degrees from the 1800s until the 1960s,
the criminal and judicial systems gave men a right to beat their
wives.12' Even after the repeal of criminal laws specifically
exempting violent husbands from prosecution, the police and
prosecutors were generally unwilling to intervene in domestic
affairs.'22 The traditional pairing of sexual violence and domestic life
created a culture of tolerance for domestic violence.'23 To counter
this history, advocates focused on forcing the state to declare
domestic violence a crime and to ensure that law enforcement
agencies would act accordingly.12 4 These laws successfully relocated
domestic abuse from the private domain into the public sector.125 In
117. See id
118. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 1 (2000).
119. See id. at 196; GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 116, at 36; Miccio, supra note 1, at
272-73.
120. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 116, at 36 (stating that activists felt the state needed
to take responsibility for a problem of such massive proportions).
121. See Janet M. Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The Legacies of Coverture, 28
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 593, 597-98 (1991); Miccio, supra note 1, at 252-53.
122. Miccio, supra note 1, at 266, 269.
123. Judith Resnik, The Law: Citizenship and Violence, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 27-Apr. 10,
2000, at 62 (explaining that when violence is understood as being about sex, it
"softens the brutality" and provides abusers with lust as the justification).
124. See Miccio, supra note 1, at 264-65 (describing how advocates successfilly
implemented mandatory arrest as a means of holding law enforcement accountable for
responding to domestic violence).
125. See LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM 16 (2012).
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essence, they removed state power as a coercive force in support of
the dominance of men, redirecting it on behalf of women. 126
Not all advocates were in agreement with the adoption of
enforcement as a key strategy. Many felt uneasy with employing the
state to protect women, recognizing that police practices typically
enforced cultural stereotypes that were gendered, raced, and
classed. 127 Further concern centered on the misuse of police power
against women, particularly in communities of color.128  Advocates
confronted the question posed by Angela Davis at the historic Color
of Violence Conference: "Can a state that is thoroughly infused with
racism, male dominance, class-bias, and homophobia and that
constructs itself in and through violence, act to minimize violence in
the lives of women?"1 29
In the end, advocates conceded the partnership as a necessary
strategy.'30 They acknowledged that any state institution would be
plagued with varying degrees of misogynistic policies and
procedures, and at the same time, altering women's position required
a relationship with the state and with state actors.' 3  While being
mindful of "the roles of the state, other institutions, law, and culture
in encouraging, legitimizing, and perpetuating violence," a middle
ground had to be found.13 2
B. Battered Immigrant Women's Movement
In the battered immigrant women's movement, advocates first
rallied together for battered immigrant women in reaction to the
passage of the 1986 Marriage Fraud Act, 3 3 which mandated an
126. Id.
127. See Miccio, supra note 1, at 269.
128. Cecelia M. Espenoza, No Relief for the Weary: VA WA Relief Denied for Battered
Immigrants Lost in the Intersections, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 185-86 (1999) (noting
that abused women of color are disadvantaged in police exercise of discretion for
which they rely on erroneous and stereotypical attitudes and perceptions).
129. Angela Davis, The Color of Violence Against Women, 3 COLORLINES, Fall 2000, at 4,
6.
130. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1887-88 (1996) (supporting the
notion that, although it is not ideal, the benefits of aggressive prosecution of domestic
violence perpetrators outweigh the costs).
131. See Miccio, supra note 1, at 271.
132. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 118, at 196.
133. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, § 2, 100 Stat.
3537, 3537-38 (codified as amended at INA § 216, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a (2006)). The
Marriage Fraud Act imposed a new status of "conditional resident" for an immigrant
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additional petition for immigrant spouses to obtain full legal status.134
The Act passed to offset allegations of widespread immigration fraud,
now widely accepted to have been based on purely speculative
data."' The uproar that followed galvanized the advocate community
in demanding a fix, an effort that led to the successful passage of the
Battered Spouse Waiver in 1990.1" Once this network had been
formed, it used its newly established strength and congressional
contacts to continue to push for protections for domestic violence
victims.'37
The strategy advocates employed to move the legislation forward
was rational and effective: they would locate their issues inside the
battered women's movement rather than the immigrants' rights
movement."' Advocating separately for protections for immigrant
women would not have been fruitful in the tense, anti-immigrant
climate of the 1990s. Because national sentiment against domestic
violence was strong, battered women's advocates rightfully assessed
that their agenda would be better received in the context of the need
for protection from domestic abuse, rather than the need for reform to
having status approved based on a marriage of less than two years. INA § 216(a)-(b).
That status would be removed two years later when the couple submits further
evidence of the bonafides of the marriage. Id. § 216(c)(3)(B).
134. INA §216(c)(1)(A).
135. See Michelle J. Anderson, Note, Recent Development, A License to Abuse: The
Impact of Conditional Status on Female Immigrants, 102 YALE L. J. 1401, 1419
(1993) (noting that one of the bill's original sponsors, Representative Bruce Morrison,
was disappointed with the Marriage Fraud Act, reiterating that Congress had "directed
the INS to write protection regulations, not fraud regulations").
136. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 701(a)(4)(C), 104 Stat. 4978, 5085
(codified as amended at INA § 216(c)(4)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(C) (2006)). The
Battered Spouse Waiver was created as an exception to the requirement of the joint
filing at the end of the conditional period, where the immigrant suffered spousal
abuse.
137. Representative Slaughter was approached as a sponsor due to her strong record
against domestic violence. See Women 's Issues, CONGRESSWOMAN LOUISE M.
SLAUGHTER, http://www.louise.house.gov/index.php?option=com-content&view-
category&layout=blog&id=83&Itemid=1 34 (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
138. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1246-47 (1991)
(reporting tragic consequences resulting from immigrant women being forced to
choose "between protection from their batterers and protection against deportation ...
put pressure on Congress to include in the Immigration Act of 1990 a provision
amending the marriage fraud rules to allow for an explicit waiver for hardship caused
by domestic violence").
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the immigration system.'3  Even the bill's sponsors had to overcome
the fact that "illegal" immigrants would benefit.14 0  The bill was
framed as the need for protection under the law without regard to
immigration status.141 Congressional concerns about helping the
undocumented were allayed by the understanding that "but for" an
abuser's misuse of control of the immigration process through his
refusal to exercise his power, the victim would have legal
immigration status. 142
In moving forward with VAWA, battered immigrant women's
advocates had to confront the historically problematic relationship
between law enforcement and battered women mentioned above,
particularly for women of color.143 These concerns were even more
pronounced in the anti-immigrant environment since the 1990s, and
after the changes in immigration policy (outlined above) made
contact with law enforcement more dangerous.'"
Following the harsh legislative changes to immigration law in 1996
and 2001, women disproportionately shouldered the brunt of the
militaristic enforcement measures.145 They not only faced the risk of
deportation for themselves or family members, but the related "risks
139. See Leslye E. Orloff & Janice v. Kaguyutan, Offering A Helping Hand: Legal
Protections For Battered Immigrant Women: A History Of Legislative Responses, 10
Am. U.J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 95, 143, (2002) (discussing the realization that
immigration law provided an imperfect and often ineffective solution for many
immigrant victims of domestic violence) See also Sujata B. Barai, Negotiating the
Intersection: How and Why Provisions for Battered Immigrant Women Have Become
a Part of U.S. Immigration Policy 68 (Apr. 2, 1998) (unpublished B.A. thesis,
Princeton University) (on file with author).
140. Id. at 72 (quoting from an interview with legislative aide Sandra Sobrieraj, February
17, 1998).
141. See 146 CONG. REC. 22066-67 (2000).
142. See id. at 22070 (noting Sen. Orrin Hatch raised that the law was being used to
blackmail the abused spouse through threats about immigration sponsorship).
143. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 116, at 77-78.
144. See Deanna Kwong, Removing Barriers for Battered Immigrant Women: A
Comparison of Immigrant Protections Under VA WA I & II, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 137, 137, 143 (2002).
145. Id. at 148-49; Michael T. McCarthy, Recent Development, USA Patriot Act, 39
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 435, 435, 448-49 (2002); Andrea J. Ritchie, Law Enforcement
Violence Against Women of Color, in COLOR OF VIOLENCE, THE INCITE! ANTHOLOGY
138, 139 (2006) (noting that women of color experience the same types of law
enforcement violence as men of color, including "law and order agendas," "war on
terror," "zero tolerance" policies, as well as gender-related harassment and sexual
abuse).
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of economic deprivation, separation from children, and [the
possibility of] even greater violence in their home country."1 4 6
The threats of immigration raids and the post-9/1 1 societal
perception of immigrants as potential lawbreakers or terrorists further
intimidated women. 147 Just as the war on drugs justified the "law and
order" policies of the last two decades, the more recent war on
terrorism has led to military and law enforcement policing under
"quality of life" initiatives in immigrant communities.148 For
immigrant women, the threat of deportation from the most minor
police encounter became a reality as the newer laws encouraged
linkages between the Department of Homeland Security and local
municipalities, in essence deputizing police officers with federal
powers.149  Renee Saucedo, Community Empowerment Coordinator
at La Raza Centro Legal, charged that immigration raids are used as a
tool to subjugate women into submission.'s Immigrant women
experienced harassment by law enforcement directly to themselves or
indirectly through having to tolerate abuses to others for fear of being
caught by the police.'"' The ongoing potential threat of criminal or
immigration law enforcement effectively silences women from
146. See Donna Coker, Race, Poverty, and the Crime-Centered Response to Domestic
Violence: A Comment on Linda Mills's Insult to Injury: Rethinking Our Responses to
Intimate Abuse, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1331, 1334 (2004) (exposing several
of the laws' vulnerabilities for immigrant women: "Conviction for domestic violence
is a deportable offense (8 U.S.C. § 1227), and although the attorney general may
waive deportation for those acting in self-defense, some battered women's violence is
unlikely to fit the definition of self-defense . . . ."); see also Espenoza, supra note 128,
at 185-86; Linda Kelly, Stories From the Front: Seeking Refuge for Battered
Immigrants in the Violence Against Women Act, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 665 passim
(1998); Leslye E. Orloff, et al., With No Place to Turn: Improving Legal Advocacy for
Battered Immigrant Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 313 passim (1995); Julia L. Perilla,
Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Issue: The Case oflmmigrant Latinos, 21 HIsp.
J. BEHAV. SCI. 107, 118, 122 (1999).
147. See Ritchie, supra note 145, at 139, 154-55.
148. Id. at 155.
149. See INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).
150. Renee Saucedo, INS Raids and How Immigrant Women are Fighting Back, in COLOR
OF VIOLENCE, THE INCITE! ANTHOLOGY, supra note 145, at 135-37; cf Julia Sudbury,
Rethinking Antiviolence Strategies: Lessons from the Black Women's Movement in
Britain, in COLOR OF VIOLENCE, THE INCITE! ANTHOLOGY, supra note 145, at 13, 19
(noting that the anti-violence movements in the United States, Britain, and Canada
have all been complicit in the law enforcement agenda simultaneous to the
globalization of the last two decades); Renee Saucedo Community Empowerment
Coordinator, LA RAZA CENTRO LEGAL, http://lrcl.electricembers.net/
article.phplarticle.php?story-rsaucedo-bio (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
151. Saucedo, supra note 150, at 135-37.
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complaining about sexual harassment or asserting basic rights, thus
making immigrant women easy prey for unscrupulous employers,
landlords, or others with power.15 2
In spite of the dangers, many advocates for battered immigrant
women agreed that working through the law enforcement framework
was the only realistic way to access immigration relief.'13
IV. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT SUCCESSES
As the subsequent phases of the battered women's movement
gained the targeted benefits from partnering with law enforcement
agencies, each also experienced a significant erosion of basic feminist
principles.154 This section will chronicle some of the losses for the
battered women's movement generally and then focus on those of the
battered immigrant women's movement more specifically.
A. Battered Women's Movement
1. Questioning Survivor Autonomy
The demands of early battered women's advocates that domestic
abuse be treated as a serious crime successfully led to policies of
mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution, among others.' While
these policies accomplished the goal of ensuring that law
enforcement would take decisive action toward protecting battered
women, they also challenged the notion of survivor agency or
independence."' Instead of fostering a return of choice to a survivor,
the state usurped control of the decision-making process. Once the
police were called, mandatory policies removed from the victim all
control of the process or the outcome.157 The prosecution moved
forward regardless of the threat of retaliation against the victim, the
economic support provided to the family by the abuser, or her wish to
152. Id.
153. See Emi Koyama, Disloyal to Feminism: Abuse of Survivors within the Domestic
Violence Shelter System, in COLOR OF VIOLENCE, THE INCITE! ANTHOLOGY, supra note
145, at 208, 220.
154. GOODMAN & EPsTEIN, supra note 116, at 36 (asserting that expanded available
resources "also diminished the movement's original feminist orientation").
155. GOODMARK, supra note 125, at 106-07.
156. Id.; see also Miccio, supra note 1, at 240-42.
157. GOODMARK, supra note 125, at 107.
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forgive or reconcile with her partner.'5 ' Her agency ended when she
first accessed the protection of the state.
Some early proponents of mandatory state action justified this shift
in agency with the thesis that a victim of domestic abuse had an
impaired ability to make autonomous decisions in her own self-
interest.'5 9 Such hypotheses failed to recognize the multitude of ways
survivors of domestic violence exercise decision-making within the
abusive relationship.160 Regardless of these critiques, policies were
accepted as necessary to protect women.
In retrospect, advocates predominantly conclude that the battered
women's movement unnecessarily ceded control over the responses
to domestic violence, enabling the state to take primary responsibility
for addressing, defining and analyzing domestic violence and for
determining the objectives of the response.' 6 ' Many critics view this
phenomenon as the state successfully quashing the women's
movement's anti-violence campaign.162 Advocates of the 1960s and
1970s envisioned criminalization only as an initial undertaking in a
broader coordinated strategy to gain safety, autonomy, and
accountability for victims of domestic violence.163  It was never
intended to be the sole strategy of the movement, but a first step. '
2. Government Control of the Nature of Services
Once law enforcement was elevated as the central strategy against
domestic violence, the government backed its commitment with
158. Ana Clarissa Rojas Durazo, "we were never meant to survive" in THE REVOLUTION
WILL NOT BE FUNDED, BEYOND THE NON-PROFIT INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, 119 (2007).
GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 116, at 75.
159. GOODMARK, supra note 1265, at 121-22; see also MARILYN FRIEDMAN, AUTONOMY,
GENDER, POLITICS 151 (2003) (suggesting that the state should act to protect women
even if it is against their wishes).
160. GOODMARK, supra note 1265, at 122-23; see also Miccio, supra note 1, at 320-21
(equating the ability of battered women to that of Holocaust survivors to exercise
resistance in an oppressive environment).
161. See Rojas Durazo supra note 158, at 117-118 (asserting that in limiting the definition
of domestic violence to individual crimes, government excluded state violence and
effectively broke up the movement's radical, social justice agenda). GOODMARK,
supra note 1265, at 6.
162. Id. at 117 ("Through funding and non-profitization, the movement was called in to
sleep with the enemy, the US state, the central organizer of violence against women in
the world.").
163. Miccio, supra note 1, at 265-67; SCHECHTER, supra note 10, at 159-61.
164. Miccio, supra note 1, at 265.
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strong funding directives.'15  VAWA made available approximately
$550 million per fiscal year.166 By relying upon the criminal justice
system as the principal response to domestic violence, state domestic
response resources were funneled almost exclusively into law
enforcement projects."' As a result, few other approaches to impact
the economic, social, or political realities of battered women were
developed. 1
Non-profit funding had the same effect of funding programs that
did not fundamentally challenge the status quo. Some assert that the
non-profit industrial complex is a tool for capitalist interests to
monitor and control social justice movements, manage dissent, and
redirect mass organizing efforts away from transformation."
Regardless of the intentions of private donors, the funding stream
reinforced that social change efforts would be financed and therefore
controlled by benefactors rather than by community constituents.170
The results of the influx of funding had a surprisingly significant
impact on the movement. Programs that served victims of domestic
violence were expanded by over fifty percent in less than a decade. 71
Domestic violence advocates did not foresee that over time this
receipt of desperately needed resources into their programs would co-
opt the feminist underpinnings of the movement.' 72 Along with the
flow of government funds came demands for professionalism and
accountability to the state. State and private funding streams favored
"shelters founded by established charities over those begun by
165. GARRINE P. LANEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30871, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
ACT: HISTORY AND FEDERAL FUNDING 1-2 (2010), available at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1716&context-key
workplace.
166. See id at 3-9.
167. See Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence
Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 801, 804-05 (2001).
168. Id.; see also GOODMARK, supra note 125, at 6.
169. Andrea Smith, Introduction, The Revolution Will Not Be Funded, THE REVOLUTION
WILL NOT BE FUNDED: BEYOND THE NON-PROFIT INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, 3 (2007)
170. Id.at9.
171. See GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 116, at 38 (funding increased rapidly from 1986
to 1994); GOODMARK, supra note 125, at 25-26.
172. See GOODMARK, supra note 125, at 27; see also SCHECHTER, supra note 10, at 6
(forewarned as early as 1982 that "shelters need to view themselves simultaneously as
services and as movement organizations. Only by maintaining this tension will the
spirit of progressive social change continue to inspire women and help mobilize them
for the fight ahead to keep shelter doors open").
2013] 251
UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW
feminists."' "Because these organizations were not feminist ...
both programmatic and organizational focus changed."1 7 4
When state funds were directed to feminist-run agencies, strict
conditions were imposed that began to change the very nature of the
shelters that were previously at the center of the battered women's
movement.' Before partnering with law enforcement, shelters were
often managed in a non-hierarchical fashion and staffed by survivors
of domestic violence.' Women needing shelter were welcomed as
sisters." Shelters were a site for "consciousness-raising" and
profound examination of the position of women in a patriarchal
society."
In contrast, state funding altered the way in which shelters
operated. The government demanded academically credentialed staff
and traditional governance, marginalizing survivors without
professional academic degrees and destroying the egalitarian
operational structures."' Battered women became "clients" and
shelters were forced to track information reflecting clinical
perspectives.' Private foundations similarly preferred funding
organizations focused on policy and legal reform, or campaigns with
measurable results and specific programmatic goals. Such directives
further encouraged a professionalization of the movement, straying
further from grassroots driven organizing.' Eventually the battered
women's movement was depoliticized and de-contextualized from its
feminist roots. No longer was the eradication of domestic violence
understood to depend on ending women's subordination and
173. GOODMARK, supra note 125, at 25 (citing ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY:
THE MAKING OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 194 (1987)) (discussing the historical analysis of
social policy shaping funding for family violence).
174. Miccio, supra note 1, at 291.
175. Id at 257, 292-93.
176. See GOODMARK, supra note 125, at 25; see also Miccio, supra note 1, at 292-93.
177. SCHECHTER, supra note 10, at 4; see also Judith L. Herman, Foreword to GOODMAN &
EPSTEIN, supra note 116, at xii (commenting about the early days of the women's
movement).
178. See Miccio, supra note 1, at 313-14 ("[Consciousness-raising] groups were utilized in
the early battered women's movement as a vehicle to deconstruct subjective
knowledge about male intimate violence and to approximate common ground.").
179. Patricia Gaddis, In the Beginning: A Creation Story of Battered Women's Shelters,
OFF OUR BACKS: THE FEMINIST NEWSJOURNAL, Oct. 2001, at 14, 15; see also Miccio,
supra note 1, at 292-93. Also see Rojas Durazo, supra note 158, at 116-17.
180. See GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 116, at 43-44.
181. See Smith, supra note 169, at 7.
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increasing their economic and social empowerment.18 2 The vision of
broad social change had been replaced by service deliverables.
B. Battered Immigrant Women's Movement
Consonant to the experience of the broader battered women's
movement discussed above, the advances gained by the battered
immigrant women brought forth serious challenges to germane
feminist principles. VAWA legislation merged the interests of the
state with those of the movement to end domestic violence but in a
way that pulled the movement in new directions.'84 The
criminalization of domestic violence created a dual advantage for the
state: the perpetrator became the sole party responsible for violence
against women and the state allied itself with battered women against
the perpetrator.' Activists ultimately relinquished to law
enforcement the power to frame and legislate the issues.' In time,
the language and requirements of the expanded laws served to
undermine survivors by rewarding victimhood and by demanding
dependence.187
1. Framing of the Issues
Since the passage of VAWA 1994, the initial, unified stand against
domestic violence by feminists and bipartisan congressional sponsors
has slipped from legislative consciousness and has been sacrificed to
other objectives.' The purpose statements of the original VAWA
and the subsequent reauthorizations provide insight into the changes
in the framing of the issues. Each of the bills reference law
enforcement aims, however, the preliminary statements of the bills'
subsections introducing protection for battered immigrant women
182. Id at 117 (as organizations became dependent on private foundations, they lose
political autonomy and their sense of accountability shifts from their constituents to
their funders). See also GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 116, at 47; see also
Koyama, supra note 153, at 213-14.
183. See Durazo, supra note 158, at 118, 123-24 ("The social servicization of the anti-
violence movement undermined social change.").
184. Id. at 119.
185. Id. at 118.
186. See GOODMARK, supra note 125, at 128.
187. See Espenoza, supra note 128, at 220.
188. Janet Calvo, A Decade of Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: Coverture's
Diminishment, but Not Its Demise, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 153, 155 (2004).
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expose the shift in thinking of the congressional sponsors and the
relative power of the advocates from the women's movement. 9
The preamble of VAWA 1994, enacted as Title IV of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Authorization,
provides a clear message that a loophole in the law facilitating
domestic abuse was unacceptable and must be corrected.' 90  It
recognizes that "some abusive citizens or lawful permanent
residents . .. misuse their control over the petitioning process.
Instead of helping close family members to legally immigrate, they
use this discretionary power to perpetuate domestic violence against
their spouses and minor children who have been living with them in
the United States."l91
By the VTVPA Reauthorization Act 2000, a dual purpose was
adopted, replacing the singular message of the original VAWA.19 2 It
set forth the purposes of the amendments: "(1) to remove barriers to
criminal prosecutions of persons who commit acts of battery or
extreme cruelty against immigrant women and children; and (2) to
offer protection against domestic violence occurring in family and
intimate relationships that are covered in State and tribal protection
orders, domestic violence, and family law statutes."l93
Section 1513 of the VTVPA 2000 conceived the U visa with the
purpose "to create a new nonimmigrant visa classification that will
strengthen the ability of law enforcement agencies to detect,
investigate, and prosecute cases of domestic violence, sexual assault,
trafficking of aliens, and other crimes described in section
101(a)(15)(U)(iii) of the INA committed against aliens, while
offering protection to victims of such offenses in keeping with the
humanitarian interests of the United States." 94 Here the language is
explicit that law enforcement is the priority, with protection of the
victim considered a supportive, secondary goal.'95
189. See VAWA 1994, supra note 9, § 40701, 108 Stat. at 1953-54; VTVPA, supra note 9,
§ 1502(b), 114 Stat. at 1518.
190. See VAWA 1994, supra note 9, § 40701, 108 Stat. at 1953-54; 61 Fed. Reg.
59,13061, 59,13062 (Mar. 26, 1996).
191. 61 Fed. Reg. 59,13061, 59,13062 (Mar. 26, 1996) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.2
(1997)).
192. VTVPA, supra note 9, § 1502, 114 Stat. at 1518; see VAWA 1994, supra note 9, §
40701, 108 Stat. at 1953.
193. VTVPA, supra note 9, § 1502, 114 Stat. at 1518.
194. Id. § 1513(a)(2)(A), 114 Stat. at 1533.
195. Id.
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The subsequent reauthorizations in section Title VIII-Protection
of Battered and Trafficked Immigrants from 200516 and that of
2013-have no statement of findings or purpose. Those bills
launched directly into the legislative changes, which were far more
moderate than those from the original VAWA. Perhaps by the later
reauthorizations, the history of VAWA was redundant. This silence,
however, is conspicuous in light of the vigorous opposition preceding
the bills and the harsher tones of the law that followed.
Whereas the three prior bills all received strong bipartisan support,
negotiations on VAWA 2013 failed last year precisely along party
lines. Much of the controversy surrounded the expanded protections
to victims from the LGBT community, tribal populations and
undocumented immigrants. The statements by elected officials during
the hostile debates about the 2013 reauthorization illustrate the
disparate frameworks. Senator Grassley, a prime opponent of the
Senate bill, explained his objection by stating "The substitute creates
so many new programs for underserved populations that it risks
losing focus on helping victims, period." Further, regarding
immigrant survivors, Grassley posed the legislative aims as follows:
"VAWA is meant to protect victims of violence. It shouldn't be an
avenue to expand immigration law or give additional benefits to
people here unlawfully." 19 7
In contrast, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Pat Leahy urged
the House to consider the broader version of VAWA, emphasizing
that Congress couldn't "pick and choose" which victims to protect
under the legislation." He maintained that the purpose of VAWA
was to protect all victims of sexual assault or domestic violence,
declaring "a victim is a victim is a victim and violence is violence is
violence."' 99
2. Narrowing Relief to Innocent, Deserving Victims
196. See VAWA 2005, supra note 9, § 801, 119 Stat. at 3053.
197. Amanda Turkel, Violence Against Women Act Becomes Partisan Issue, HUFFINGTON
POST (Feb. 16, 2012, 5:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/14/violence-
against-women-act_n_1273097.html.
198. Mercedes White, Why Some Oppose Extension To Violence Against Women Act,
DESERET NEWS (Feb. 14, 2013, 12:12 PM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/
865573170/Why-some-oppose-extension-to-Violence-Against-Women-Act.html.
199. Sunlen Miller, Senate Passes Violence Against Women Act, ABC NEWS (Feb. 12,
2013, 5:26 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/02/senate-passes-
violence-against-womens-act/.
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The original VAWA legislation was written in a straight-forward
manner, reflecting a focused goal to provide battered women with
exceptions in the law enabling them to legalize their status
independent from the control of their abusers.20 0 If an applicant met
the criteria for self-petitioning, she was eligible for the relief.201' As
long as the applicant could show she had been a victim of physical
battering or extreme cruelty, the law would excuse immigration
violations from her past that would have otherwise prevented her
from legalizing her status.202 The justification was simple; no woman
should be trapped in an abusive relationship. 203 That clarity of
message was lost in the later developments of the law.
i. All Qualifying Victims
In the initial legislation, an immigrant married to a U.S. citizen or
legal permanent resident could "self-petition" for her own residency
if she could meet the following elements: show a legal and good faith
marriage, joint residence, spousal abuse, good moral character and
extreme hardship. 20 There was no examination of why the
immigrant did not already have status, whether she arrived without
documentation, overstayed a temporary visa, or violated other
205
immigration provisions. It was enough that Congress recognized
the terrible predicament created when the abuser had control of his
victim's immigration status. The focus of the law was prospective
towards a remedy, independent of past-based fault or merit.
To facilitate appropriate adjudication of the self-petition,
exceptions to corresponding sections of immigration law were
devised.206 To begin, the evidentiary standard for proving abuse was
established as "any credible evidence." 207 This standard reflected an
acknowledgement that domestic abuse commonly happened behind
closed doors and that not every survivor sought help from police or
medical providers.208 A 1996 INS memorandum clarified that a
200. VAWA 1994, supra note 9, § 40701, 108 Stat. at 1953.
201. Id.
202. See id.
203. VTVPA, supra note 9, § 1502(a)(1), 114 Stat. at 1518 (codified as amended 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (2006)).
204. VAWA 1994, supra note 9, § 40701(a)(1)(C), 108 Stat. at 1954 (codified as amended
at INA § 204(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)).
205. See id.
206. See id. § 40701(a)(2)-3).
207. Id. § 4070 1(a)(3).
208. Cf Habrzyk v. Habrzyk, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (discussing the
difficulty in meeting the clear and convincing standard for battered parents using the
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woman's affidavit by itself, if sufficiently detailed and credible,
could successfully support a self-petition application.20 9 A flexible
standard was consistent with the overarching goal of facilitating
survivors in leaving abusive homes.
VTVPA 2000 and VAWA 2013 provide examples of practical
amendments to VAWA that made the self-petitioning requirements
more accessible to all qualified applicants; first, by removing one of
the initial requirements, second, by granting the ability to adjust
status to legal permanent resident status in the United States, and
third by eliminating the barrier of public charge.210
Example 1: Extreme Hardship
The 1994 VAWA self-petition required proof that the applicant or
her children would suffer "extreme hardship" if she were deported
back to her home country.21' There was no specific definition
provided for extreme hardship; however, it had to encompass "more
than the mere economic deprivation . .. [or] readjustment to life in
the native country after having spent a number of years in the United
States . ... The types of acceptable evidence could include "the
nature and extent of the physical and psychological consequences of
the battering or extreme cruelty[,] .. . the impact of the loss of access
to the U.S. courts and criminal justice system . . . [, or the] abuser's
ability to travel to the foreign country" to cause further harm.213 In
the VTVPA reauthorization in 2000, the extreme hardship element
was entirely removed from the requirements,2 14 recognizing that it
presented a devastating obstacle for survivors and unnecessarily
focused on the immigrant's life in the home country, a prerequisite
grave risk of harm defense); Petitions for Relatives, Widows and Widowers, and
Abused Spouses and Children, 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2)(iv) (2007) (discussing the
various avenues in which battered women seek treatment or support).
209. Petition to Classify Alien as Immediate Relative of a United States Citizen or as a
Preference Immigrant; Self-Petitioning for Certain Battered or Abused Spouses and
Children, 61 Fed. Reg. 59,13061, 59,13066 (Mar. 26, 1996) (codified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 204.2 (1997)) ("The Service is not precluded from deciding ... that the self-
petitioner's unsupported affidavit is credible and that it provides relevant evidence of
sufficient weight to meet the self-petitioner's burden of proof.").
210. VTVPA, supra note 9, §§ 1501, 1504(a), 114 Stat. at 1505, 1522-23, 1525-27.
211. VAWA 1994, supra note 9, § 40701(a)(1)(C), 108 Stat. at 1953-54.
212. Petition to Classify Alien as Immediate Relative of a United States Citizen or as a
Preference Immigrant; Self-Petitioning for Certain Battered or Abused Spouses and
Children, 61 Fed. Reg. at 59,13067.
213. Id.
214. See VTVPA, supra note 9, § 1503(b)(1), 114 Stat. at 1518-19 (codified as amended in
INA § 204(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § I1 54(a)(1) (2006)).
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that did not parallel the family petitioning process.2' With this
change, the process was made more consistent with the congressional
intent for all applicants.
Example 2: Adjustment of Status
Next, the VTVPA 2000 addressed impediments created by changes
in IRAIRA that made battered spouses with approved self-petitions,
no longer able to complete the legalization process of obtaining legal
permanent residents if they were out of status.2 16 According to the
provisions of IIRAIRA, an immigrant who had entered the country
without a visa or who had overstayed her visa was prevented from
adjusting her status unless she was married to a U.S. citizen.2 17
response, Congress included in VTVPA 2000 a direct amendment to
INA § 245(a), the statute governing eligibility to adjust status in the
United States, to include all VAWA self-petitioners regardless of the
manner of entry into the country or the length of time since the
expiration of any prior legal status.218  There was no need for an
applicant to explain the reason she had fallen out of status, nor any
requirement to tie that infraction to the abusive spouse. It was
enough that the applicant had already satisfactorily proved the
elements of the self-petition.2 19
Example 3: Public Charge
In spite of the intense debates on some of the provisions in VAWA
2013, the removal of the public charge ground of inadmissibility
received little attention. Ordinarily, a person seeking adjustment of
status to a legal permanent resident via the family based process must
make available her financial history and that of the sponsor. These
records are scrutinized to determine the likelihood that the applicant
215. See supra note 139, at 145.
216. See VTVPA, supra note 9, § 1506(a), 114 Stat. at 1527 (codified as amended in INA
§ 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255)).
217. IIRAIRA § 301(b)(1), 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified at INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 11 82(a)(9)(B) (2006)). The combination of being prevented from using adjustment
of status within the limitations of INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) and the three and
ten year bars that were passed under IIRAIRA means that many immigrants married
to US citizens or legal permanent residents are unable to legalize their status, even
after years of residing in the US. See INA, Pub. L. No. 84-414, § 245(a), 66 Stat. 163,
217, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2006); IIRAIRA § 301(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 3009-575-3009-
576,8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i).
218. VTVPA, supra note 9, §§ 1502-03, 114 Stat. at 1518-19 (codified as amended in
INA § 204(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)).
219. See id. § 1503.
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would become a public charge, or financially depend on the state. If
minimum financial stability is not shown, the applicant can be denied
her legal permanent residency. Under VTVPA 2000, self-petitioners
were exempt from having to provide the typical affidavit of support
demonstrating the financial health of the sponsor, since there was no
sponsor. However the applicant still needed to establish her ability to
support herself. VAWA 2013 made all applicants for adjustment of
status based on the battered spouse protections, exempt from the
examination of public charge. As in the above sections, the fact that
the applicant was a victim of domestic violence was adequate
justification. There was no need to provide a nexus between the
domestic abuse and her immediate financial state, nor that she was
without fault for causing her weak economic health. The waiver was
for all self-petitioners.
Consistent with the purpose of the VAWA, the congressional intent
was clear that all battered women should have access to self-
petitioning and should be permitted to take advantage of a path to
legal permanent status.220 Both the removal of the extreme hardship
language and the exceptions to the adjustment of status process were
fashioned for all applicants without imposing any individual
scrutiny.221
ii. The Innocent Victim
Changes in the nascent objective of VAWA began to occur in the
2000 Act as advocates pushed for expanded assistance to battered
immigrant women.22 2 In contrast to the blanket exceptions for self-
petitioners outlined above, a very different paradigm was crafted for
those with other immigration infractions.
Now, in order to become a legal permanent resident, an approved
self-petitioner with an immigration violation needed to show she was
not responsible for having caused the infraction, but that her abuser
had forced it upon her.223 It could be argued that the good immigrants
were innocent of wrongdoing and were assumed worthy, while those
220. Mayte Santacruz Benavidez, Comment, Learning from the Recent Interpretation of
INA Section 245(a): Factors to Consider When Interpreting Immigration Law, 96
CAL. L. REv. 1603, 1609-10 (2008).
221. See id.
222. See Orloff& Kaguyutan, supra note 139, at 145-56.
223. See Violence Against Women Act of 2000 § 1505(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(7)(A)
(2006).
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who were themselves responsible for their immigration infractions
(bad immigrants) had to prove they deserved relief.224 The later
amendments providing exceptions to the bars for unlawful presence,
the failure to depart under voluntary departure, and the bigamy
exception illustrate the added level of individual scrutiny.
Example 1: Unlawful Presence
As noted earlier, the concept of "unlawful presence," classified the
time an immigrant is present in the United States without
authorization.22 The unlawful presence becomes problematic only
when an immigrant leaves the country after collecting six months or
one year in this category, causing her to be ineligible for receiving
legal permanent residence for three or ten years, respectively.2 26 The
2005 reauthorization aimed to overcome this barrier for approved
self-petitioners by creating a waiver for some applicants.22 7
Eligibility for the waiver was made contingent on proof of a
"substantial connection" between the reason for her leaving the
country and the abuse she endured.2 28 If no such connection existed
or could be proved, an approved self-petitioner would be unable to
access this waiver and would be prevented from becoming a
permanent resident of the U.S. 22 9
Example 2: Failure to depart after voluntary departure
A similarly narrow exception was passed for violators of another
immigration provision, voluntary departure. 230 After an immigrant in
224. Cf id.
225. IIRAIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 301(b)(1), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-576 (1996)
(codified as amended in INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) (2006)).
226. Id., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). After collecting more than 180 days but less than
365 days of unlawful presence, the immigrant will be inadmissible for three years.
Id., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I). If more than 365 days of unlawful presence is
acquired, the bar will be ten years. Id., 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).
227. Id. § 301(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(ii).
228. Id., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(ii)(III).
229. See id. § 301(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i). Practically speaking, many VAWA
petitioners would not be subjected to these bars since the amendments to § 245(a)
mentioned above mean that self-petitioners could adjust their status in the U.S.
without having to leave the country and trigger the bars. See supra notes 218-219 and
accompanying text. Some self-petitioners, however, make themselves inadmissible
under this ground prior to the self-petition, or leave the U.S. for other reasons, such as
family emergencies.
230. IIRAIRA, § 304(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1) (2006).
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removal proceedings loses her case in immigration court, the
immigration judge can grant voluntary departure in lieu of a removal
order.2 3 1 If the immigrant agrees to leave the country voluntarily at
her own expense and within a specific time allotment, the
immigration judge can allow her to use this path to avoid the negative
consequences of a removal order.232 Failure to actually depart in
accordance with a grant of voluntary departure will bar the immigrant
from becoming a legal permanent resident for a ten-year period and
could subject her to civil penalties as well.233 Congress, again
exempted some approved self-petitioners from this bar, but only
those who could demonstrate that the "extreme cruelty or battery was
at least one central reason for ... overstaying the grant of voluntary
departure."2 34 For those who could not meet this standard, the waiver
would be denied.2 35
Example 3: Bigamy Exception
After the initial VAWA, advocates saw that in addition to other guile,
abusers frequently deceived their spouses about the validity of the
marriage itself. Many women attempted to self-petition as abused
spouses of U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents, only to find that
the marriage was invalid. VTVPA 2000 was responsive to this
discovery by designing an exception for these circumstances, but
only if the applicant could show that she had been misled and was not
complicit in the bigamy.236 VAWA 2013 extends this exception to
conditional residents using the battered spouse waiver to receive her
permanent residence. 23 7 Identical qualifying language from VTVPA
limited the waiver to those innocent of wrongdoing.2 38
231. Id.
232. Id., 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(A)-(B).
233. VAWA 2005, supra note 9, § 81 (codified as amended 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1)(A)-(B)
(amending INA § 240B)).
234. VAWA 2005, supra note 9, § 81 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(2)).
235. Id.
236. INA §§ 204(a)(1)(A)(ii)(II)(aa)(BB) and 204(a)(1)(B)(ii)(II)(aa)(BB).
237. See supra note 135.
238. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (Enrolled Bill [Final as Passed
Both House and Senate] sec. 2 Title VIII, sec. 806.
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In each of these examples the applicants had already proved the
abuse and had their petitions granted. This fact alone was no longer
sufficient to open a pathway to the freedom of legal permanent
residency. Unless the approved self-petitioner could also show her
innocence in the immigration infraction by tying it to the abuse, her
former violation would not be forgiven.239 If a survivor had met her
abuser after she had already violated the terms of unlawful presence
or voluntary departure, or she was aware of her abuser's bigamy, she
would not qualify for the exemption from those bars, even if her
abuser specifically used her lack of status as part of his abuse.240
iii. The Deserving Victim
The last grouping of exceptions was constructed for battered
immigrant women who are not innocent of past infractions and are
therefore required to show themselves deserving of exception.
Special VAWA motions to reopen and requirements for the U visa
will serve as examples.
Example 1: VAWA Motions to Reopen
Some approved self-petitioners had previously been apprehended
and ordered deported or removed by immigration authorities, often in
absentia and even without their knowledge. 241  Before an immigrant
with a prior removal order can seek permanent immigration status,
she must first re-open the old removal order in immigration court.242
For immigrants generally, the regulations allow only ninety days after
the issuance of the order to reopen.2 43
In this regard, VTVPA 2000 promulgated an exception for
approved self-petitioners who needed to reopen cases beyond one
year after a final order of deportation or removal. 244 To utilize this
239. See VTVPA, supra note 9, § 1504(a), 114 Stat. at 1522-23 (2000) (codified as
amended at INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)).
240. Cf id
241. See IIRAIRA § 304(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A)-(C). The common scenario is an
immigrant who is bonded out of detention and leaves officials with an address for
future communication but does not remain at that address and thus never receives
notice of a hearing. See id., 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1). Actual service is irrelevant, as the
onus is on the immigrant to provide the government with address updates. Id., 8
U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F)(i)-(ii).
242. See id., 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C).
243. Id., 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).
244. VTVPA, supra note 9, § 1506(c)(1)(A) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(c)(7)(iv)).
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exception, a woman must not only show her eligibility for the
underlying battered spouse protection, but must additionally prove
"extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship to . . . [her] child"
(not to herself). 245 Although the applicant's self-petition may already
have been evaluated and approved, if she cannot meet these
additional requirements to reopen her court case, she will never be
able to obtain the security intended by the VAWA provisions.24 6
Embedded in this requirement is the assumption that the deserving
victim would have acted timely, before the lapse of one year.
Legislators can then justify a heightened standard beyond the one
year mark for survivors, many of whom will not be able to overcome
this impediment and will be unable to achieve permanent
immigration status.247
Example 2: The U Visa
The U visa is procedurally positioned differently, as it is outside the
previously discussed amendments for survivors of domestic violence
who would have had relief based on their marriage to a United States
citizen or legal permanent resident. 248 The U visa marked expanded
relief to reach a battered woman who was not married to her abusive
partner or whose abusive spouse did not have legal status.2 49 The U
visa remains a useful example of the concept of a "deserving victim"
because it requires for relief further proof of merit, beyond the
baseline proof of being a crime victim. 25 0 In order to qualify for U
visa relief the applicant must also show that she had suffered
"substantial" harm and that she has offered assistance to law
enforcement.2 5 1 On top of proving the domestic abuse, an applicant
must demonstrate her worthiness of relief by the degree to which she
was harmed and by her usefulness to law enforcement in prosecuting
the case.252
245. Id.; see also Orloff& Kaguyutan, supra note 215, at 158.
246. See VAWA 1994, supra note 9, § 40701(a)(1)(C) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1154(a)(1)(A)).
247. See VTVPA, supra note 9, § 1506(c)(1)(A) (codified as amended 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(c)(7)(iv)) (leaving sole discretion to the Attorney General for decisions on
whether or not to waive the one-year time limitation for filing motions to reopen).
248. Compare id. §§ 1502-06, with id § 1513.
249. See id. § 1513(a)(2), 114 Stat. at 1533-34.
250. Id. § 1513(b)(3) (codified as amended 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)-(ii)) (providing a
broad list of twenty-six qualifying crimes, including domestic abuse).
251. Id. § 1503(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I)-(III).
252. See id.
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While the immigration violations of applicants in this grouping are
no more serious that those discussed in the first section, the tenor of
Congress had changed as the reauthorization bills were passed. The
exceptions ceased to be forward-looking toward the survivor
accessing safety and independence, but were now past-based,
scrutinizing innocence and requiring an earned deservedness for
relief.253
Many of the 2012 proposed amendments put forth in the substitute
bill from the House of Representatives contained the demand for
earning the relief sought. HR4970 proposed fraud investigations
against self-petitioners requiring an in-person interview, raising the
standard of proof to clear and convincing evidence, and making relief
contingent upon the abuser's conviction of any domestic violence
crimes.254 That amendment further restricted U visas availability to
only those who report crimes within 60 days and while still within the
statute of limitations for the crime, when the investigation or
prosecution was active, and where the identify of the perpetrator
could be known. 255  The bill's sponsor Representative Chuck
Grassley explained that with these changes, U visas will become a
"true law enforcement tool" and that these provisions would ensure
that help is "real" and "significantly advances an actual investigation
or prosecution." 25 6  All of these amendments were defeated in
Congress.
3. Creating Dependence
The third way in which the immigration provisions for battered
women diverged from the essential principles of the feminist
movement was in moving away from a model intent on returning
agency to the survivor, toward more recent provisions that created
further dependence for a domestic violence victim on law
enforcement officials.
253. Cf Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards' Fathers and Good Victims:
Discarding Citizens and Equal Protection Through the Failures of Legal Images, 51
HASTiNGS L.J. 557, 580 (2000) (raising concerns about characterizing women as only
deserving protection if they are good victims).
254. H.R. 4970 §801, Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2012.
255. H.R. 4970 §802(2)(B) Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2012.
256. Senator Chuck Grassley, Judiciary Committee Executive Business Meeting
Violence Against Women Act, Nominations (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel_dataPagelD 1502=3882.
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The public perception of a woman who experienced domestic
abuse transitioned over the years from early accusations of
masochistic tendencies, 257 theories of learned helplessness and the
"battered women's syndrome," 258 and finally to the more modem
construct of a "survivor." 259 Portraying women who had experienced
domestic violence as survivors acknowledged that battered women
are found in a society providing them with limited options and that,
within this context, they actively take measures to protect themselves
and their children from abuse.260 Shelters that were a part of the
feminist movement empowered women through programs that
expanded their options and by validating their individual choices as
legitimate.26 1 The language of early VAWA protections for
immigrant women recognized the importance of ensuring that
survivors had control of these processes; however, the later
provisions involving law enforcement do not.262
a. Early Control ofProcess By Immigrant Survivor
The 1994 VAWA provisions corrected the imbalance that the U.S.
citizen or legal permanent resident spouse had complete control over
the petitioning process, a fact that was thoroughly exploited by
abusers. VAWA allowed a battered immigrant spouse to take charge
of the legalization process for herself and her children.263 Under
VAWA, it was the applicant who would self-select as a battered
spouse and choose to begin her own immigration petition.2M With
the "any credible evidence" standard referenced earlier,2 65 she could
prove her case through whatever means available given her unique
situation.266 The law did not mandate production of specific pieces of
257. GOODMARK, supra note 125, at 55-56 (citing John E. Snell et al., The Wifebeater's
Wife: A Study ofFamily Interaction, 11 No. 2 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY (1964));
see also GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 116, at 52; Natalie Shainess Vulnerability
to Violence: Masochism as Process, 33 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 174, 178 (1979).
258. See GOODMARK, supra note 125, at 58-59; LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED
WOMAN passim (1979).
259. See EDWARD W. GONDOLF WITH ELLEN R. FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS passim (1988).
260. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 116, at 54; see also GOODMARK, supra note 125, at
62.
261. See SCHECHTER, supra note 10, at 108-09.
262. See Kelly, supra note 253, at 575, 583, 585-86.
263. See id. at 575.
264. See id.
265. See supra text accompanying note 207.
266. See Petition to Classify Alien as Immediate Relative of a United States Citizen or as a
Preference Immigrant; Self-Petitioning for Certain Battered or Abused Spouses and
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evidence, understanding that survivors might have limited or no
access to the family home or official documents. 2 67  Regulations
authorized use of secondary evidence that could be used as proof.2 68
This standard of proof was not always the rule, but was adopted
only after an arduous advocacy campaign.2 69  The battered spouse
waiver predated VAWA and provided the first protection for battered
spouses.27 0 According to its terms, an applicant whose abuse had been
in the form of extreme mental cruelty (and not physical abuse) was
obligated to provide proof "supported by the evaluation of a [mental
health] professional recognized by the [Immigration] Service as an
expert in the field."271' The advocacy community strongly rejected
this standard, criticizing that it was unfair to determine eligibility for
the waiver based on how damaged the survivor was as a result of the
mistreatment.2 72 The only factor that should be relevant is whether or
not the perpetrator's actions constituted abuse."7 Focusing instead
on the victim's mental health validated a flawed premise. If a woman
could withstand horrific emotional or psychological abuse without
lasting damage, should the abuse no longer serve as a basis for
relief? 274 The terms of VTVPA 2000 corrected this flaw by ensuring
that "any credible evidence" could be used to objectively prove that
the abuse actually occurred.2 75
Similarly, the self-petitioner was granted full autonomy to narrate
her story in her own distinct voice. She could use the affidavit as one
of the most central proofs in her application to convey her history in a
way that most accurately depicted what happened.27 6 To satisfy the
"battery or extreme cruelty" element of the self-petition, the applicant
Children, 61 Fed. Reg. 59,13061, 59,13066 (Mar. 26, 1996) (codified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 204.2 (1997)).
267. Id. at 59,13066; see VAWA 1994, supra note 9, § 40701(a)(3), 108 Stat. at 1953-54.
268. See Petition to Classify Alien as Immediate Relative of a United States Citizen or as a
Preference Immigrant; Self-Petitioning for Certain Battered or Abused Spouses and
Children, 61 Fed. Reg. 59,13066.
269. Cf James A. Jones, Comment, The Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments: Sham
Marriages or Sham Legislation?, 24 FLA. U. L. REv. 679, 689-90 (1997).
270. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
271. 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3)(iv) (1993).
272. Jones, supra note 269, at 690.
273. See id.
274. Martha F. Davis & Janet M. Calvo, INS Interim Rule Diminishes Protection for
A bused Spouses and Children, 68 INTERPRETER RELEASES 665, 668 (1991).
275. See VTVPA, supra note 9, § 1505(b), 114 Stat. at 1525 (codified as amended at INA
§ 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(7)(B) (2006)).
276. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c) (2012).
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need only establish that she endured abusive behavior. 277  This
standard does not demand that she paint a picture of victimization.
There was no need for classic recitations of traditional courtships,
loving relationships turning abusive, cycles of violence, hopelessness,
and finally, separation. Few survivors see themselves entirely as
victims, devoid of choice or completely helpless in a marriage. Use
of the affidavit allows a woman to explain her choices and to describe
the history of the relationship in thoughtful, nuanced terms.2 7 8 The
survivor's narrative may include mixed emotions of love and anger,
self-defense, fighting back, ambivalence regarding the course of the
relationship, confusion as to her role, family or cultural pressures,
and fear about extricating herself from the relationship.27 9
Remarkably, VAWA officers are well-prepared for this complex
challenge. All VAWA self-petitions are adjudicated by the staff of
the USCIS Vermont Service Center, where a VAWA unit receives
specialized training in the dynamics of domestic violence.280 The
VAWA unit has been acknowledged for the quality of its application
review.281 With few exceptions, if an adjudicator has doubt about the
facts or if there are apparent inconsistencies, she will send the
applicant a "request for evidence" giving her an opportunity to clarify
or elaborate on the point in question.28 2  While the self-petition
process cannot escape the confines of the family petitioning schema,
which generally disadvantages women,23 it does give broad
277. Id. § 204.2(c)(E)-(H).
278. Ann Shallek, Theory And Experience In Constructing The Relationship Between
Lawyer And Client: Representing Women Who Have Been Abused, 64 TENN. L. REV.
1019, 1025-26 (1997). Cf Espenoza, supra note 128, at 167; Kelly, supra note 146,
at 696-99.
279. Leigh Goodmark, When is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She
Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 113-114 (2008).
280. USCIS, REPORT ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT UNIT AT
THE USCIS VERMONT SERVICE CENTER: REPORT TO CONGRESS II (Oct. 22, 2010)
("Members of the VAWA Unit undergo rigorous initial training . .. significantly more
thorough and of greater duration than [other USCIS lines,] . . . followed by a lengthy
period of mentorship of newer officers by more senior adjudicators.").
281. Id. at 16.
282. See USCIS, ADJUDICATOR'S FIELD MANUAL - REDACTED PUBLIC VERSION ch. 10.5
(2012), online version available at http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/
menuitem.f6da51a2342135be7e9d7alOeOdc91aO/?vgnextoid=fa7e539dc4bed010Vgn
VCMOOOOOOecdl9oaRCRD&vgnextchannel=fa7e539dc4bedOOVgnVCMlOOOOOOe
cdl90aRCRD&CH=afm.
283. Calvo, supra note 121, at 613-14 (concluding that while "[a]lien spouses of both
sexes are theoretically subject to the law's spousal domination," women bear the
greatest adverse impact because "the immigrants gaining status as spouses have been
predominantly female," "[w]ives have legally and socially been the historical target of
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flexibility for the applicant to portray herself more fully than the
stereotypical, helpless victim, without jeopardizing her case.28 4
These protections were seriously challenged by the proposed House
amendments to VAWA 2013, demanding the repeal of the any
credible evidence standard, inclusion of the abuser's input and
evidence, as well as a required professional assessment validating the
physical or emotional harm.285
b. Ceding Control of the Process to Law Enforcement
The regulations for the U visa represent a far departure from the
independence granted to self-petitioners. 2 86  The U visa provisions
codify dependence of an immigrant survivor of domestic violence on
law enforcement. Because the U visa grant is contingent upon of a
victim's assistance to law enforcement agencies, police and
prosecutors have full control of the legalization process at two critical
junctures: first, in determining who is a victim in a domestic violence
scenario, and second, in exercising discretion to issue the certificate
and the follow up verification of helpfulness. 287  Then, in spite of
overcoming those obstacles, the regulations also require the victim to
show that she was substantially harmed as a separate element.2 88
1. Determining Who Is a Victim
When called to a domestic dispute, police are responsible for two
competing functions: enforcement of the law, which often includes
discovery of undocumented immigrants, and protection of victims,
regardless of immigration status. When the police approach the
subordination in marriage," and the majority of victims of spouse abuse are women);
see supra notes 263-264 and accompanying text.
284. Cf Alizabeth Newman, Bridging the Justice Gap: Building Community by
Responding to Individual Need, 17 CLINICAL L. REv. 615, 628 (2011) (discussing the
use of boilerplate documents blurring the uniqueness of the individual).
285. See supra note 254.
286. INA § 101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I)-(IV), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I)-(IV) (2006); see also
Jamie Rene Abrams, Legal Protections for an Invisible Population: An Eligibility and
Impact Analysis of U Visa Protections for Immigrant Victims of Domestic Violence, 4
MODERJN Am. 26, 27 (2008) (discussing petitioner eligibility requirements for a U visa
which inherently require the petitioner to rely on certifications from other entities
outside of the petitioner's control).
287. INA § 101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I), (III), 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I), (Ill); see also
Abrams, supra note 286, at 32-33; Leslye E. Orloff et al, Battered Immigrant
Women's Willingness to Call for Help and Police Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J.
43, 78-79 (2003).
288. INA § 101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(1); see also Abrams, supra
note 286, at 27, 33.
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scene of a domestic incident, they must distinguish who is the victim
and who is the perpetrator. Even at best, law enforcement's response
to an immigrant victim is informed by societal notions of race and
gender, which dictate determinations of who is a legitimate victim.28 9
Many law enforcement officers recognize as victims only those who
are innocent, passive, and under total control of her abuser.2 90 Such a
narrow understanding of domestic abuse can result in no action being
taken, or possibly the arrest of the wrong person, or of both people.
How the police interpret victimization when the victim is
undocumented and the abuser has status varies greatly from one
district to the next.
Too often the police are met at the door by a savvy abuser who
speaks English and with whom the police identify more readily than
the immigrant partner.2 91  When the abuser's explanation seems
plausible to the responding officers, many victims have reported that
the police leave without interviewing the victim and without making
a police report.292
At worst, outright xenophobia has led certain police precincts to
simply neglect to protect immigrant crime victims or to refuse to
make the new federal tools available.2 93 Some survivors attempt to
file a police report and are turned away because the police did not
witness the attack or because there is no interpreter available.2 94 in
many instances when a report is issued, it does not reflect the events
as told by the survivor, but downplays the seriousness of the violence
of the incident, making it unusable in proving the violence.2 95
289. See Ritchie, supra note 145, at 151.
290. See Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect Victims and Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in
Domestic Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U. L. REV. 157, 195 (2007).
291. See MARGARET ABRAHAM, SPEAKING THE UNSPEAKABLE: MARITAL VIOLENCE AMONG
SouTH ASIAN IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 122 (2000).
292. See Leslye E. Orloff et al., Battered Immigrant Women's Willingness To Call for Help
and Police Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 43, 55 (2005).
293. Jamie R. Abrams, The Dual Purposes of the U Visa Thwarted in a Legislative Duel,
29 ST. LouIs U. PUB. L. REV. 373, 377 (2010).
294. Leslye Orloff & Olivia Garcia, Dynamics of Domestic Violence Experienced by
Immigrant Victims, in BREAKING BARRIERS: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO LEGAL RIGHTS
AND RESOURCES FOR BATTERED IMMIGRANTS 1, 3, 15 (2004).
295. In one case managed by the author, the abuser attempted to stop the victim and their
two toddlers from leaving in a car by smashing his car into them. The police report
that followed spoke of verbal harassment. On file with author.
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2. Issuance of the Helpfulness Certificate
The VAWA statute makes the issuance of the law enforcement
certificates completely discretionary, but requires it as the key piece
of evidence in a case.296 Without the certificate, an applicant cannot
apply for the U visa.297 As with any policing issues, districts vary
greatly in how difficult it is for them to issue the certificates.298 Some
districts outright refuse to even consider the issuance of the U
certification.299
Ineffective Autonomy Language
Ironically, advocates lobbied heavily during the drafting of the U
visa to distinguish it by having it controlled by the victim, not by law
enforcement.oo Authors carefully worded the provision to give
victims maximum independence by making the certificate available
at any stage of the process, even before prosecution, thus allowing
the victim to freely come forward to participate. 30' Law enforcement
agencies are charged with certifying that the victim 'has been
helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful' in the investigation
or prosecution of criminal activity."30 2 The future-looking option was
meant to give full agency to the victim by assuring her that she could
come forward to speak out against her abuser without having to
worry about her immigration status.30 3 If the victim chose to assist in
296. INA § 101(a)(15)(U)(i)(III), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(Ill) (2006); Ordonez
Orosco v. Napolitano, 598 F.3d 222, 226-27 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
389 (2010).
297. INA § 214(p)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(1) (2006).
298. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2011) (discussing the general
nature of why discretion is afforded to government agents when dealing with the
policing of immigration); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(2), (b)(3) (2012).
299. See Abrams, supra note 293, at 387.
300. Memorandum from National Network on Behalf of Battered Immigrant Women,
Implementing the U Visa (2001), available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/assets/
pdfs/wwwimplementing.pdf (noting their interpretation of the negotiated language to
mean that "[a]lthough the new visa may bear some superficial similarities to S visas,
one significant distinction is that the victim, not a prosecutor, is the applicant
controlling the process"). The S visa requires that a potential applicant comply
completely with requests for assistance to law enforcement agencies in drug cases as a
prerequisite to law enforcement's application for the relief. See INA §
1 101(a)(15)(S), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(S).
301. See 72 Fed. Reg. 53,014, 53,019 (Sept. 17, 2007).
302. INA § 214(p)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(1) (2006) (referencing INA 101(a)(15)(U)(iii), 8
U.S.C.A. (a)(15)(U)(iii)).
303. See VTVPA, supra note 9, 114 Stat. at 1513(a)(1) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1101 (2006)); Micaela Schuneman, Note, Seven Years of Bad Luck: How the
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the prosecution of her abuser, she could qualify for the U visa.30
Unfortunately, this did not turn out to be the case. In practice, law
enforcement agencies have unchecked discretion if and when to sign
the certificate, which directly determines whether or not an applicant
can apply for relief.305 Commonly prosecutors deny consideration of
the certificates until the close of a trial, fearing the defense counsel
will accuse the victim of ulterior motives in testifying to obtain
immigration status. 3 06 This policy often prolongs the issuance of the
certificate, and the applicant's ability to file and secure any stability
for months or even years.
Similarly, the language of the statute "investigation or prosecution"
was meant to sever the determination of helpfulness from a district
attorney's decision to prosecute and from the ultimate success of the
case.30 ' An applicant should be issued a certificate if she provided
helpful information to investigate a crime of domestic violence, even
if the prosecution decided to charge the perpetrator with a different
crime, declined to prosecute at all, or went to trial and lost the case.
However, in making the waiver completely discretionary, the
provisions leave "helpfulness" to be arbitrarily interpreted in different
districts.30 s In verifying "helpfulness," a law enforcement agency
confirms that a victim is deserving of the certification.309 If they do
not deem the victim worthy, they can simply decline to issue the
certificate.31 0 The applicant has little recourse.3 11
The competing provisions in the early versions of VAWA 2013
regarding the issuance of the law enforcement certificates highlighted
Government's Delay in Issuing U-Visa Regulations Further Victimized Immigrant
Crime Victims, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 465, 481 (2009).
304. INA §§ 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii), 2 14(p)(1), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii), 1184(p)(1)
(2006).
305. Ordonez Orosco v. Napolitano, 598 F.3d 222, 226-27 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 389 (2010).
306. Promoting U Visas With Local Officials, NAT'L IMMIGRANT FAMILY VIOLENCE INST.,
http://www.nifvi.org/Promoting%20U%2OVisas%20with%20 Local%200fficials.pdf
(last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
307. See 72 Fed. Reg. at 53,020 ("This rule does not require that the prosecution actually
occur, since the statute only requires an alien victim to be helpfil in the investigation
or the prosecution of the criminal activity."); INA §§ 101(a)(15)(U)(i)(III), 214(p)(1),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)15(u)(i)(I1I), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(1)).
308. See Ordonez Orosco v. Napolitano, 598 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 389 (2010).
309. See 72 Fed. Reg. at 53,020.
310. See id.; see also Abrams, supra note 293, at 395 (outlining multiple ways in which
departments have overstepped their authority).
311. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(b)(3) (2012).
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the struggle for dependence/independence of the U visa applicant.
The initial Senate version of VAWA, S1925, included the
consideration of secondary evidence of helpfulness in lieu of the law
enforcement certificate.3 12 The House amendment, H.R. 4970
diametrically countered this clause by expressly prohibiting issuance
of the U visa absent the law enforcement certification."' Neither
amendment survived the final passage of the bill.
Prolonged Dependence
Worse still, the issuance of the certificate does not end law
enforcement's control of the process. Even if the victim is successful
in obtaining the U visa, her dependence continues.3 14 Three years
after the U visa is approved the immigrant becomes eligible to apply
for permanent status, and she must re-certify that in those three years
she has not refused any further reasonable requests for assistance.315
If she cannot do so, she can lose the U status and the opportunity
afforded her through VAWA.3 16
What is seen as a "reasonable" request to the victim may not be
considered as such by law enforcement. In addition to the fear and
distress any crime victim might face in choosing to assist in the
prosecution of her attacker, immigrant survivors face added
obstacles." Most survivors of domestic violence will express that
312. S 1925 §805(a), Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2012.
313. H.R. 4970 §802, Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2012 (amending
INA § 214(p)(1) (8 U.S.C. l184(p)(1)) to read: "No application for a visa under
section 101(a)(15)(U) may be granted unless accompanied by the certification as
described in this paragraph").
314. See INA § 245(m)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(m)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2007-2011); DEPT.
HOMELAND SECURITY, U VISA LAW ENFORCEMENT CERTIFICATION RESOURCE GUIDE
FOR FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL AND TERRITORIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 4,
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_u visacertification-guide.pdf (last visited
Jan. 11, 2013).
315. See INA § 245(m), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(m).
316. See id.; DEPT. HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 314, at 4 (directing law enforcement
agencies contact and inform USCIS of the victim's unreasonable refusal to provide
assistance in the investigation or prosecution should this occur after the issuance of
the initial certification).
317. See PATRICIA TjADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE &
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, EXTENT, NATURE, AND
CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 49-54 (2000), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/181867.pdf; Orloff & Kaguyutan, supra note 215,
at 97-99, 133-35.
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calling the police is a measure of last resort.3 18 If they do so, it is to
stop the violence, but it is not necessarily to have the abuser
punished.3 1 9 For the immigrant community, an arrest means more
than a tainted record or time served for the abuser-it may also mean
deportation or removal.320 If the abuser is the father of her children or
the family breadwinner, a deportation would be a devastating loss for
the victim and her family. Mothers are faced with an excruciating
decision. Helping law enforcement to prosecute her partner may
mean sacrificing him in order to obtain immigration status for herself
and her children.
In addition, many applicants face further fears of retaliation from
their abusers.32 ' In some instances the abuser has legal immigration
status and thus the power to unite the victim with her children living
in her home country.322 Or to the contrary, some abusers know that
their own deportation is imminent and therefore make threats to harm
the woman's family members in the home country.3 23 Some women
are aware or resentful of law enforcement's racially disparate
treatment of minority communities, and may refuse to participate on
that basis. 3 24 None of these motivations may appear reasonable to the
authorities.
Expanding forms of acceptable evidence is an essential step in
returning to the applicant some of the independence written into the
original U visa, and it will make the protections more available to
immigrant communities. As mentioned above, attempts to do so in
VAWA 2013 were unsuccessful.3 25
318. See TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 317, at 49-51.
319. See Richard B. Felson et al., Reasons for Reporting and Not Reporting Domestic
Violence to the Police, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 617, 631 (2002).
320. See INA § 237(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) (2006) (codifying domestic
violence as an aggravated felony, which can be used to remove a legal permanent
resident with a criminal conviction).
321. See Karyl Alice Davis, Unlocking the Door by Giving Her the Key: A Comment on the
Adequacy ofthe U-Visa as a Remedy, 56 ALA. L. REv. 557, 568-72 (2004).
322. See Orloff & Kaguyutan, supra note 215, at 97-99, 133, 134-35; For Immigrant
Women, CENTER FOR RELATIONSHIP ABUSE AWARENESS (2010),
http://stoprelationshipabuse.org/for-immigrant-women/.
323. See Linda Kelly, Domestic Violence Survivors: Surviving the Beatings of 1996, 11
GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 303, 320-21 (1997); CENTER FOR RELATIONSHIP ABUSE AWARENESS,
supra note 322.
324. See Ritchie, supra note 145, at 140 (charging that until the experiences of women of
color who are survivors of law enforcement violence are addressed in the dominant
paradigms of police brutality and violence against women, their voices will remain
largely unheard and their rights unvindicated).
325. See supra notes 215 and 216.
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c. Returning to Harm-Based Victimhood
The terms of the U visa that condition relief to a victim based on a
showing of substantial harm return us to the inequities of the past."'
In applying for the U visa, the applicant must demonstrate that she
has suffered "substantial physical or mental abuse" as a result of
being a victim of an enumerated crime or substantially similar
criminal activity.3 27  The harm is defined as "injury or harm to the
victim's physical person, or harm to or impairment of the emotional
or psychological soundness of the victim. "328 Proving the harm is the
applicant's burden.3 29  In determining whether the abuse is
substantial, USCIS will consider a variety of factors.3 30
This definition of harm harkens back to the problematic terms of
the 1990 battered spouse waiver previously rejected. That standard
initially required a mental health professional to document that a
woman had suffered extreme cruelty."' It incorrectly focused
eligibility for relief on the harm sustained by the victim rather than
the criminal behavior of the abuser.33 2 Under the current construction
of the U visa, objective proof of the abusive actions to which a victim
had been subjected is not considered sufficient, and additional proof
of subjective harm is required.333 For the same reasons that standard
was rejected under the battered spouse waiver, maintaining this
flawed measure in the U visa will lead to nonsensical conclusions
whereby the weaker victim is favored for relief over the stronger
survivor based on the same type of criminal activity.334 As with the
326. See INA § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(15)(U) (2006); infra notes 331-335 and
accompanying text (discussing the problematic terms of the battered spouse waiver
which conditioned relief based on the victim's showing of harm).
327. See INA § 101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I); 8 C.F.R.
§ 214.14(c)(2)(i) (2012).
328. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(8); see also INA § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I).
329. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(4). Note that it is the applicant's burden to show substantial
harm; however, at times law enforcement has overstepped its bounds, making the
decision to issue the certification contingent on their affirmative finding of substantial
harm. Id.; see also supra notes 305-306 and accompanying text.
330. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(b)(1) (listing factors such as: "nature of the injury .. . the severity
of the perpetrator's conduct; the severity of the harm suffered; the duration of the
infliction of the harm; and . . . permanent or serious harm to the appearance, health, or
physical or mental soundness").
331. See supra notes 270-274 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 270-274 and accompanying text.
333. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(b)(1).
334. See supra notes 270-278 and accompanying text.
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battered spouse waiver, the qualifying abuse should stand on its own
without the need for the survivor to have to emphasize on her
victimization in order to qualify for relief.335
Once again, the best efforts of advocates successfully attained
expanded protections for battered immigrant women. However,
many of the statutory requirements and actual practices of the law
enforcement partners directly conflict with the feminist principles at
the heart of the women's movement.3 3 6
V. CONCLUSION
This article is intended to contribute to an ongoing dialogue of
reflective practitioners and advocates. As we work to utilize and
strengthen protections for battered women, we must recognize that
these laws do not reach the root causes of domestic violence and are
thus incapable of eradicating domestic abuse.337 Criminal justice
approaches are simply interim and limited responses to an ongoing
crisis. Inattention to the interwoven, systemic causes for domestic
violence prevents a productive understanding of the inequities in
cultural, economic, and political institutions that combine to support
violence against women, ethnic minority women, and immigrant
women.3 8  Effective "public policy should reflect an integrated
response that identifies and locates both the source of violence and
support for such violence."' Of course legal work and enforcement
should be included in the panoply of approaches, but those
approaches will be ineffective and even damaging as the exclusive
tactics.340 In addition, we must strive to ensure that as we play our
distinct roles in the struggle to end domestic violence, we are being
faithful to the feminist principles of "autonomy, individual and
335. See supra notes 270-278 and accompanying text.
336. See infra Parts III-IV.A.
337. See Coker, supra note 167, at 848-49.
338. See ABRAHAM, supra note 2921, at 2.
339. Miccio, supra note 1, at 323.
340. Symposium, Battered Women & Feminist Lavmaking: Author Meets Readers,
Elizabeth M Schneider, Christine Harrington, Sally Engle Merry, Rende R6mkens &
Marianne Wesson, 10 J.L. & POL'y 313, 359-60 (2002) ("Criminalization as a
solution in itself is a big problem . . . [if the domestic violence it seeks to deter is] not
linked to the larger issues of women's economic situation, gender socialization, sex
segregation, reproduction, and women's subjugation within the family.").
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systemic accountability, and safety."341 As Gandhi reminded us, "We
always have control over the means, but not over the end." 34 2
341. Miccio, supra note 1, at 322 (asserting that "all policies that affect women survivors
of male intimate violence should be passed through the prism of autonomy, individual
and systemic accountability, and safety").
342. GANDHI'S EXPERIMENTS WITH TRUTH: ESSENTIAL WRITINGS BY AND ABOUT MAHATMA
GANDHI 118 (Richard L. Johnson ed., 2006) (quoting Gandhi in Young India, 724).
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